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Foreign Bidder-
A Statutory Analysis and Proposals for
Reform of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act and the Ethics in
Government Act
By MICHAEL I. SPAK*
INTRODUCTION
In our pluralistic society, individuals and groups routinely make
the government aware of their concerns through lobbying efforts.
It is only with this information about the concerns of its constit-
uency that government can formulate effective policy and legisla-
tion. As Americans, we exercise our democratic rights in stating
our case before government officials.
However, not only do Americans lobby the federal government
for attention to their concerns, foreign entities increasingly attempt
to influence U.S. government action for their own benefit. Through
* Professor of Law, lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.S. 1958, J.D. 1961, De
Paul University; LL.M. 1962, Northwestern University. The author acknowledges the highly
original contributions of Wayne H. Zaideman, Esq., a member of the Illinois Bar and
Jeffrey Eric Margulis, a second year law student of lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. In
addition he acknowledges the contribution of his research assistant, Keith J. Turner, a third
year law student of lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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hired lobbyists, media consultants, public relations advisers, and
other advocates, foreign governments and corporations are trying
to get their agenda heard and acted upon.
Foreign influence poses a clear danger to the integrity of federal
policy and legislation. The danger is that high-powered lobbyists
representing the concerns of foreign parties may crowd out the
legitimate concerns of Americans in the governmental decision-
making process.
This danger is exacerbated by the increased presence of former
high-level federal officials among the ranks of those who are paid
to advocate the concerns of foreign governments and corporations.
These former officials create much more cause for concern than
ordinary lobbyists. Former officials have inside information and
contacts that ordinary lobbyists do not have at their disposal. When
former officials use inside information and contacts at their former
agency to unduly influence agency action for the benefit of their
foreign employers, the efficiency and impartiality of the federal
government are truly compromised.
One of the most recent and highly-publicized instances of a
former official using his inside information and contacts for foreign
interests is the scandal that enveloped former White House deputy
chief of staff Michael Deaver. After leaving his White House
position, Deaver set up Michael Deaver & Associates, a lobbying
firm that capitalized on Deaver's inside knowledge and contacts at
the White House. ' With fees between $100,000 and $1.5 million,
his new enterprise was soon billing $4.5 million a year 2
What eventually undid Deaver's career were allegations that he
was lobbying White House officials on matters in which he partic-
ipated as a White House aide, a violation of the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act of 1978.1 Deaver represented Rockwell International,
which manufactures the B-1 bomber, by discussing future sales
with then director of the Office of Management and Budget, James
Miller 4 During his tenure in office, Deaver attended the National
Security Council meetings where the B-1 bomber was discussed;
Deaver's fee for representing Rockwell was $250,000.1
1 Martz, Borger, De Frank, McDaniel, & Thomas, Deaver's Deals, NEWSWEEK, May
5, 1986, at 18 [hereinafter Martz].
2 Id.
Act of October 26, 1978, P.L. 95-521, 2 U.S.C. § 701 (1978). See infra notes 119-
222 and accompanying text.
4 Martz, supra note 1, at 18-19.
Id. at 18.
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Deaver was also accused of lobbying on behalf of U.S. busi-
nesses operating in Puerto Rico. 6 Those businesses paid Deaver to
lobby former administration colleagues to push for retention of
tax loopholes that benefited their Puerto Rican activities to the
tune of $500 million, which is lost revenue to the federal treasury 
7
Deaver's fee was undisclosed. 8
Deaver also was alleged to have lobbied then Transportation
Secretary Elizabeth Dole on behalf of Trans World Airlines. Deaver
agreed to speak with Dole about getting the Transportation De-
partment to halt Carl Icahn's takeover of the airline; Deaver's fee
for one phone call was $250,000. 9 Boeing Aircraft was also paying
Deaver for his services. Deaver lobbied the White House for a
lucrative $200 million contract for a new Air Force One. 0 Boeing
got the contract and Deaver received $250,000 for services ren-
dered. II
More alarming, however, were Deaver's lobbying activities on
behalf of foreign interests. He represented the South Korean in-
dustrial giant, Daewoo Corporation, by meeting with high-level
Treasury Department officials on Daewoo's behalf. 2 Daewoo had
been assessed criminal and civil penalties by the Treasury Depart-
ment for conspiracy and fraud in violation of U.S. trade laws.
3
Deaver met with two Treasury officials in hopes of reducing Dae-
woo's final liability, for which he received a $250,000 fee.
14
Deaver also took a controversial $1.5 million contract with the
government of Saudi Arabia, primarily to lobby for the Saudis in
anticipated Capitol Hill fights over delivery of AWACS and other
military sales. 5 Deaver's clients also included the governments of
Singapore and Mexico ($250,000 each per year) and the South
Korean government, through the proxy of the "International Cul-
tural Society of Korea" ($475,000 per year).
6
6 Id. at 19.
7Id.
9Id.
9 Have Influence Will Travel, TmE, November 16, 1987, at 25.
1o Beckwith, The High Price of Friendship, TuM, December 28, 1987, at 23.
Id.
iZ Martz, supra note 1, at 19.
13 Id.
1 Id.
" Shapiro, De Frank, Borger, and Fineman, Has Mike Deaver Gone Too Far?,
NEWSW EK, April 14, 1986, at 23.
16 McDonald, The Questions About Deaver, MAcLEAN'S, March 24, 1986, at 17
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Still, the activity that drew the most public attention was Dea-
ver's representation of the Canadian government on the acid rain
issue, 17 While in office, Deaver advocated accommodating Cana-
dian concerns on the issue. His White House colleagues did not
suspect any ulterior motive for his position until they learned that
Deaver had taken a contract to represent the government of Canada
on that very issue when he left office. 8 Deaver's contract was
worth $135,000 a year from the Canadian government.' 9
Although Deaver registered himself as an agent for his foreign
clients, as required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act, his
registration statements may have omitted the detailed descriptions
of his activities that the law requires. 20 Deaver's registration state-
ment for his work on behalf of the "International Cultural Society
of Korea" is believed by some observers to have been an attempt
to hide work that he was doing for the South Korean government. 2'
Deaver's lobbying career came to an abrupt end. Investigations
by the General Accounting Office and the Oversight and Investi-
gations Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee began turning up the details of Deaver's lobbying activities.
2
As the investigations progressed, the Justice Department received
requests from both the Office of Government Ethics and the five
Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee for an independent
counsel to investigate Deaver's activities. 23
In May 1986 Attorney General Edwin Meese finally gave in to
pressure for an independent counsel and appointed Whitney North
Seymour to investigate allegations that Deaver's lobbying activity
had violated the Ethics in Government Act.24 As Seymour's nine
month investigation drew to a close, Deaver made a last-ditch
effort to stave off an indictment by attempting to have the inde-
pendent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act de-
, Martz, supra note 1, at 18.
Id. at 20,
, McDonald, The Downfall of the "Acid Rainmaker", MAcLEAN'S, March 30, 1987,
at 22,
.o See infra notes 82-118 and aiccompanying text.
23 HARPER'S, July 1987, at 48, The article includes a reprint of Deaver's registration
statement for his work with the "International Cultural Society of Korea." The description
of his activity is only one seven-line paragraph.
, Thomas & Beckwith, Much Ado About Deaver, TmE, May 26, 1986, at 20.
Martz, supra note 1, at 18.
24 On May 29, 1986 a special panel of three federal judges appointed Whitney North
Seymour as independent counsel to investigate allegations that Deaver's lobbying activities
may have violated the Ethics in Government Act. Chicago Trib., May 30, 1986, § 1, at 1.
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clared unconstitutional, His challenge was unsuccessful, as in June
1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit ruled that the independent counsel provision was
constitutional.2 5 Deaver's appeal to the Supreme Court was turned
down hours before his indictment was issued.
26
Despite Seymour's intense investigation and the information it
brought to light, the independent counsel elected only to indict
Deaver for perjury and not for any violation of the Ethics in
Government Act. The eighteen page indictment alleged that Deaver
lied three times to a federal grand jury and twice to the congres-
sional subcommittee investigating his activities. 27 The indictment
further alleged that Deaver lied when he denied participating in
White House discussions on acid rain on behalf of the Canadian
government; that he lied about arranging a meeting between Pres-
ident Reagan and an emissary from the South Korean government;
and, finally, that he lied about his lobbying activities on behalf of
the Smith Barney brokerage firm and Trans World Airlines.
2
Deaver was tried and subsequently convicted of three counts
of perjury in December 1987 These convictions carried a maximum
of $22,000 in fines and up to fifteen years in prison.29 However,
U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Jackson gave Deaver a sus-
pended three-year sentence, 1,500 hours of community service,
$100,000 in fines, and barred Deaver from lobbying the federal
government for profit during his three year probation. 0 Deaver
abandoned the last appeal of his conviction on February 3, 1989 31
Deaver's tale would not be so alarming if he were the only ex-
government official lobbying on behalf of foreign interests. He is
not. Top Washington lobbying firms with a variety of foreign
clients routinely recruit former federal officials. As the Deaver
scandal unfolded, the media began to focus on just how many
former White House staffers had left to begin lobbying and public
relations careers, As one article pointed out, "[f]oreign govern-
ments are particularly eager to retain savvy Washington insiders to
2 Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66 (DC. Cir, 1987),
Deaver v, United States, 483 U.S. 1301 (1987) (Court denied Deaver's application
to stay his imminent criminal trial pending disposition of his petition for certiorari).
"1 De Mott & Stanley, The Bill Comes Due for Deaver, TudI, March 30, 1987, at 23,
2Id,
9 Beckwith, supra note 10, at 23.
'o Chicago Trib., September 24, 1988, § 1, at 2.
s, Chicago Trib,, February 4, 1989, § 1, at 4.
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guide them through the bureaucratic and congressional maze and
polish their sometimes unsavory images in the U.S.''32
In this commentator's opinion, not enough is being done to
prevent these former federal officials from selling their influence
on the international market. The danger they pose to the integrity
of the U.S. government and the mockery they make of public
service must not continue unchecked.
This Article will first explore the provisions of the two main
statutes regulating the activities of former officials who lobby for
foreign interests: the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 and
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. Second, the shortcormngs
of the two statutes will be discussed. Lastly, this commentator will
outline some proposed reforms of these laws and evaluate those
proposals.
I. THiE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938 (FARA)
A. Legislative History
The first of the two primary laws affecting the operations of
foreign agents in the United States is the Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act of 1938 (FARA).33 Over the last fifty years, the purposes
behind the Act have changed to reflect the different manifestations
of activity conducted by foreign agents in this country What was
originally a wartime anti-propaganda measure has evolved into a
modern regulatory control over the sophisticated lobbying activities
of foreign agents.
In 1934, Congress set up a Special Committee to investigate
subversive activities in America. The Committee concluded that
"there [were] many persons in the United States representing for-
eign governments or foreign political groups who [were] supplied
by such foreign agencies with funds and other materials to foster
un-American activities, and to influence the external and internal
policies of this country -134 These foreign bodies were attempting
to alter U.S. policy through subversive propaganda disseminated
12 Thomas & Beckwith, Peddling Influence, Trn, March 3, 1986, at 28. The article
also included a list of 14 former Reagan White House officials who left to begin lobbying
careers on their own or with large Washington firms. Id. at 36.
11 The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-583, 52 Stat. 631
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 611) [hereinafter FARA] (1938).
H.R. REP No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937).
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in this country by their agents. The two primary disseminators of
the propaganda were pro-Nazi and pro-Commumst organizations
in the United States.
35
A prime example of the type of activity about which Congress
was concerned is illustrated by the "Silver Ranger" incident. In
1934, it was disclosed in Congress that a pro-Nazi newspaper
entitled Silver Ranger was being published in the United States and
that its editorial policy advocated reorganization of the United
States government to further pro-Nazi goals. 36 Other examples of
pro-Nazi activities disclosed during the 1934 session of Congress
include:
1.) evidence of large sums of money set aside for Nazi propa-
ganda in the United States;
2.) German ships and seamen smuggling Nazi propaganda into
the United States;
3.) intimidation of German-Americans by a branch of the Nazi
secret police in the United States;
4.) linking of organizations and funds in the United States in
order to spread racism and social unrest;
5.) active Nazi spying on United States military bases;
6.) use of the United States mail to distribute Nazi propaganda;
7 ) efforts to dominate and control the editorial policy of
German-American newspapers in the United States; and
8.) use of United States banks to launder and store money to
be used for Nazi propaganda.
37
In order to counter the effects of subversive propaganda efforts,
the Special Committee recommended that Congress enact FARA.
3
8
FARA neither limited nor prohibited the dissemination of for-
eign propaganda. What FARA required was that the disseminator
of the propaganda label its source. 39 It was felt that if Americans
knew the source of foreign propaganda they could make an in-
31 The legislative history illustrates that Nazi and Communist propaganda were the
main target of FARA. In fact, the words "Foreign Propaganda" in the act originally read
"Nazi Propaganda" when the House approved the Special Committee to investigate un-
American activities. See H.R. Rzs. 198, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess., 78 CoNG. REc. 4934, 4949
(1934).
36 Id. at 4941.
, Id. at 4946-47
The Special Committee's report discussed Congressional action to require dissemi-
nators of foreign propaganda to register with the Secretary of State. H.R. REP No. 1381,
supra note 34.
11 Note, Attorneys, Propagandists, and International Business: A Comment on the
FARA of 1938, 3 GA. J. INT'L & Comp L. 408 (1973).
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formed decision as to its accuracy.40 FARA was designed to limit
the effect of foreign propaganda by revealing both the identity of
foreign agents and the source of the propaganda they were dissem-
inating.4
1
FARA in its original enactment42 required a person within the
statutory definition of "agent of a foreign principal" to register
with the Secretary of State.43 The act also defined four other terms
relevant to the enforcement of FARA. "person"; 44 "United States"; 4
"foreign pnncipal"; 46 and "Secretary" 47 The Secretary of State was
made the administrator of FARA, and was responsible for collecting
the registration and supplementary statements of registrants. 4 The
Secretary of State was also given authority to institute criminal
charges against persons who failed to comply with the Act, which
provided for penalties of a jail term and/or a fine.
49
FARA was first amended in 1942 to improve enforcement 0 and
to close up certain loopholes.5' With these amendments Congress set
40 United States v, Auhagen, 39 F Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1941). The court noted that if
Americans knew the identity of foreign agents, then they could evaluate their statements
accordingly. FARA is referred to by the court as the McCormack Act.
41 H.R. REP. No. 1381, supra note 34, at 2.
42 FARA, supra note 33.
41 The term "agent of a foreign principal" means any person who acts or
engages or agrees to act as a public relations counsel, publicity agent, or as
agent, servants, representative, or attorney for a foreign principal or for any
domestic organization subsidized directly or indirectly in whole or in part by
a foreign principal. Such term shall not include a duly accredited diplomatic
or consular officer of a foreign government who is so recogmzed by the
Department of State of the United States, nor a person, other than a public-
relations counsel, or publicity agent, performing only private, non-political
financial, mercantile, or other activities in furtherance of the bona fide trade
or commerce of such foreign principal.
Id. at 632.
" "The term 'person' means an individual, partnership, association, or corporation."
Id. at 631.
4- "The term 'United States' includes the United States and any place subject to the
jurisdiction thereof." Id.
'0 "The term 'foreign principal' means the government of a foreign country, a political
party of a foreign country, a person domiciled abroad, or any foreign business, partnership,
association, corporation, or political organization." Id. at 631-32.
41 "The term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of State of the United States." Id.
" Ironically, a $75,000 appropriation for the administration of FARA was not in-
cluded in the Act. H.R. REP No. 2510, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
49 The penalty for willful noncompliance with the Act was a fine of up to $1,000 and
a maximum prison sentence of two years. FARA, supra note 33, at 632, 633.
10 The Foreign Agents Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 77-532, 56 Stat. 248, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 611-616 (1942).
11 Rep. Voorhis summarized a report by the Institute of Living Law that was highly
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forth a clear enunciation of the policy and purpose of FARA. 52 The
amendments included an expansion of the definition of the terms
"foreign principal" and "foreign agent" "Foreign principal" was
expanded to include a person or corporation controlled by a foreign
principal. 53 Agent of a foreign principal was expanded to include
foreign military personnel,5 4 while excluding newspapers and mag-
azines that were not controlled by a foreign principal. 55
The amended Act also created new exceptions to registration
for agents of nations declared vital to U.S. interests by the Presi-
dent.16 In addition, the administration of FARA was transferred
from the Secretary of State to the Attorney General's office.
Additionally, a new and more comprehensive registration form
was required from foreign agents. This form required disclosure
of activities done on behalf of foreign principals. Furthermore, the
foreign agents were required to maintain and preserve records with
respect to their activities on behalf of foreign pnncipals. The
determination of which records had to be maintained was left to
the Attorney General. 57 The penalty for noncompliance was in-
creased from a maximum $1,000 fine and/or two years imprison-
ment to a maximum $10,000 fine and/or five years imprisonment. 8
critical of the Secretary of State's enforcement of FARA. 87 CONG. Rac. 4417-19 (1941).
See 9 LAW POL'Y INT'L Bus. 985, 988 n.25 (1987). See also Institute of Living Law,
Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of Exposure, 10 U. Cm. L. Rv 107
(1943).
52 It is hereby declared to be the policy and purpose of [FARA] to protect the
national defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United States
by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities
and other activities for or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign political
parties, and other foreign principals so that the Government and the people
of the United States may be informed of the identity of such persons and may
appraise their statements and actions in the light of their associations and
activities.
Pub. L. No. 77-532, 56 Stat. 248, 249 (Policy and Purpose).
" Id. at 249, § 1(b). Of course, the rest of the definition remained in place.
Id. § 1(c)(4).
Id. at 250, § 1(d).
6 President Roosevelt vetoed the bill without this exception. The reason President
Roosevelt insisted on the exception is that he did not want to antagonize our allies, and he
believed that requiring agents to register would hurt the war effort. See Tim REGISTATION
OF FOREIGN AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A PAcATICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE at 21 (J.
Pattison & J. Taylors eds. 1981) [hereinafter LEGAL GuiDE].
11 Pub. L. No. 77-532, 56 Stat. 253. The new amendment also empowered the Attorney
General to make, amend, and rescind regulations that were necessary for the enforcement
of FARA. Id. at 257, § 10.
11 Id. at § 8(a)(2). Corporate officers were personally liable for their corporation's
failure to comply with FARA. Id. at 256, § 7. Aliens convicted under FARA could be
deported. Id. at 257, § 8(c).
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FARA was next amended in 1950 to prolong and extend lia-
bility under the Act by clarifying when the statute of limitations
would begin to run.5 9 Section 2(a) was amended to make an agent's
failure to register under the Act a continuing offense that was
relieved when the agent discontinued his or her activities. 6 Section
7 of the Act was amended so that the dissolution of any organi-
zation or corporation acting as an agent of a foreign principal
would not relieve its officers of responsibility for the organization's
compliance with FARA. 61 FARA was also amended in 1950 to
require persons who had been trained in espionage, counterespio-
nage, or sabotage by foreign governments to register under the
Act. 62
In 1961, two sections of FARA were amended. 63 First, the
commercial exemption to the registration requirement was clarified.
Persons were exempt from registration if their activities were either
1) private, nonpolitical, and financial or 2) private, nonpolitical,
and mercantile. 64 More significantly, the definition of foreign prin-
cipal was enlarged to include domestic organizations that were
substantially supervised, directed, controlled, or financed by for-
eign governments or political parties. 65 Thus, an orgamzation re-
ceiving significant funding from abroad would be required to register
with the Attorney General.
In 1963, FARA was reworked extensively by Congress. Its focus
was changed from controlling the dissemination of foreign propa-
ganda to controlling the sophisticated activities of agents acting as
paid lobbyists for foreign principals.
The 1963 Hearings on Nondiplomatic Representatives, chaired
by Senator Fullbright, were held to examine the need for new
legislation to limit the effect that foreign agents could have on
19 LEGAL GunE, supra note 56, at 25.
60 Pub. L. No. 81-642, 64 Stat. 399 (1950) (amending FARA).
61 Id. at 400.
62 Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 1005 (1950). However, this section was repealed in
1956 and a new section was added expressly stating that persons who had knowledge or
had received training in "espionage, counter espionage, or sabotage service or tactics of a
government of a foreign country or of a foreign political party, shall register with the
Attorney General." Pub. L. No. 84-803, 70 Stat. 899 (1956).
Pub. L. No. 87-366, 75 Stat. 784 (1961).
64 The exemption was clarified so that an agent could qualify for this exemption if
the agent met any one of its conditions. LEGAL GuiE, supra note 56, at 28.
61 See supra note 63.
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U.S. government legislation and policy 66 At the outset of the
hearings, it was noted that FARA would probably need to be
amended because "the circumstances that influenced the passage
of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 h[ad] changed
and its enforcement h[ad] not." 67 As previously stated, the original
purpose of FARA was to combat foreign propaganda and subver-
sion. After World War II, the United States emerged as a world
economic power. In light of this development, many nations began
attempts to influence United States legislation and policy through
lawyer-lobbyists, public relations counsel, and domestic "sympa-
thy" groups.68 Thus, while the circumstances of foreign attempts
to influence U.S. policy had changed, FARA had not been amended
to cope with this new type of "friendly propaganda.
'69
As a result of these hearings, Senator Fullbright introduced a
bill to amend FARA. These amendments were specifically designed
to combat the lobbyist-form of propaganda. The proposed amend-
ments consisted of:
1) redefining agent and foreign pnncipal;
70
2) defining new terms such as political activity and political
consultant;71
3) authorizing injunctive remedies for the Attorney Gen-
6Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963) (authorized by S. REs. 362 and S. REs. 26) [hereinafter Nondiplomatic Representa-
tives].
" Id. at 4.
" Senator Fullbright stated:
ITihe bill before the Senate primarily reflects the progressively larger role in
world affairs that the United States has had to play in the past 20 or so years.
Particularly since World War II, American foreign policy has become a central
point of reference to the policies and basic interests of virtually every nation
in the world. Thus, the efforts to influence American policy have become
correspondingly greater and subtler over the same period.
110 CONG. REc. 16033 (1964). Accord, Wegen, The Foreign Agents Registration Act: A
New Standard for Determining Agency, 6 FoaRDHAm INT'L L. REv 365, 368 (1982); Note,
Foreign Agents Registration Act: Proposed Amendments, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv 311 (1965).
For a discussion of the rights and duties of a foreign agent and legal counsel to a foreign
agent, see generally Paul, Lawyers, Privileged Communications, and the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, 11 VMN. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 753 (1978).
0 One commentator called the switch from subversive propaganda to friendly prop-
aganda a switch from "black" to "white" propaganda to illustrate the different methods
being employed by the new breed of foreign agents to influence U.S. policy in a more
subtle and sophisticated manner. Note, supra note 39, at 426.
70 110 CONG. REc. 16031.
72 Id. at 16032.
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eral; 72
4) prohibiting both campaign contributions for or on behalf
of foreign principals and contingent contracts based upon success
in political activities undertaken by the agent;7
5) requiring an agent speaking before a congressional com-
mittee to identify his agency relationship, his principal, and file
his latest registration statement as part of the Committee hear-
ings; 74
6) broadening the commercial exemption by eliminating con-
fusing terms such as "financial" and "mercantile" and replacing
them with the term "bona fide commercial activity"; 75
7) requiring filing of political propaganda with the Justice
Department when disseunated for or in the interest of the agent's
foreign principal; 76
8) authorizing the Attorney General to prescribe by regula-
tion the accounting and other business practices that registrants
must follow to meet FARA's disclosure requirements;
77
9) requiring the Attorney General to transmit to the Secre-
tary of State the initial registration along with supplemental and
amended registration statements and giving the Secretary of State
the authority to make use of the statements in any appropriate
manner; 7 and
10) exempting a United States corporation with foreign sub-
sidiaries from registering if its activities did not predominantly
serve the interests of a foreign principal.
In 1964, the bill passed the Senate, but lapsed in time prior to
any other legislative action. A nearly identical bill was introduced
in the Senate in 1965 79 The bill was in response to public demand
72 Id.
71 Id. at 16033.
74 Id. at 16032.
75 Id.
76 Id.
7 Id.
71 Id. Presumably this would give the State Department the power to release such
information as is contained in the statements of registration to the press or other agencies
of the government when it is in the interests of the United States to reveal a particular
registrant's affiliation with a foreign principal.
7 S. 693, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. III Cong. Rec. 1240 (1965).
The new bill also included what is known as the "attorney exception," which exempts
attorneys of foreign principals from registering under FARA. This exemption was added in
response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Rabinowitz v. Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964).
The Court held that an attorney who performs legal services for a foreign principal would
have to register under FARA because his activities were neither financial nor mercantile.
Id. at 610. See generally Note, Lawyers and the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 1 CoLum.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 68 (1965) (suggesting several alternatives to the requirement of Rabi-
nowitz).
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for more detailed information and reporting about the operations
and objectives of lobbyists acting on behalf of foreign interests in
the United States.80 This new lobbyist-oriented foreign agent activ-
ity was the stated reason for the amendments to FARA.8 ' Thus,
FARA, as amended, required broader registration in order to ef-
fectively control the lobbyist-form of foreign influence on U.S.
policy 82
B. When Registration is Required Under FARA
The Foreign Agents Registration Act requires persons to reg-
ister if they are working as an "agent" of a "foreign principal,"
and their activities as such are not specifically exempted from
FARA's registration requirements. The first step in understanding
when FARA requires registration is to look at the statutory defi-
nitions of "agent" and "foreign principal" as they are codified in
the Act and as they have been construed by the Attorney General
and the courts.
1. The Foreign Principal
"Foreign principal" is defined broadly in FARA to include
four categories: 1) foreign governments and political parties, 2)
persons outside the United States, 3) entities organized under the
During the 1963 hearings on nondiplomatic representations, the following letter was
submitted as evidence on the need for amending FARA in order to adapt to the changed
circumstances of foreign agent activity:
Through channels of personal obligation we have made contact with a powerful
law firm in the Senator's home state. The senior member of the firm is the
executive officer of the Senator's political machine. The second partner is the
son of the Senator's first campaign manager; there are very close family
connections between this man and the Senator. The third partner is the private
confidential attorney of the Senator; he handles important confidential matters
for the Senator's machine. All three propose to call upon the Senator on
Monday, January 30, to engage his sympathy for the position of the Domin-
ican Republic with respect to sugar legislation. They will represent themselves
as being very interested purely because of their very close ties of friendship
and business with my firm. Each of the three will adopt a different approach
to arouse the Senator's sympathy. They ask a retainer fee of $2,500.
Nondiplomatic Representatives, supra note 66, at 393-94. See also Paul, Lawyers, Privileged,
supra note 68, at 756-57.
11 Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments: Hearings on S. 693 and H.R. 390
Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 26
(1965).
'" Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244 (1966) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 611
(1982)).
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laws of, or with a principal place of business in, a foreign country,
and 4) indirect foreign principals who are controlled by any actor
in categories 1, 2, or 3.83
Two observations should be made at the outset. A foreign
principal may be from a country that is either friend or foe of the
United States.14 Moreover, persons may become foreign principals
even though they do not pay their "agent[s].1
5
1
a. Foreign Governments and Political Parties
FARA's definition of "foreign government" embraces not only
lawful (de jure) foreign governments, but also those governments
exercising authority without the force of law (i.e., insurgencies).
8 6
Moreover, U.S. diplomatic recognition is not required to meet the
definition of "foreign government" under FARA.
8 7
"Foreign political party," as it is defined in FARA, includes
organizations whose activities (at least in part) involve the purpose
of controlling a foreign government or influencing its political or
public interests.88 Hence, any political activity may bring a group
under FARA's definition of "foreign political party"
b. Persons Outside the United States
The second category of foreign principals, "persons outside the
United States," is broadly defined in FARA. It includes any indi-
vidual, partnership, association, corporation, organization, or any
other combination of individuals outside of the U.S. proper, its
territories and possessions, and any area subject to U.S. civil or
military jurisdiction. 9
83 22 U.S.C. § 611(b), (c).
11 As far back as 1943, courts have held that disclosure of the agency relationship
was required by friend or foe as long as the requisite agency relationship existed. United
States v. Kelly, 51 F Supp. 362, 363 (D.D.C. 1943).
88 It is not necessary that the relationship meet the definition of "agency" according
to the Restatement of Agency. "[Agency comprises t]he fiduciary relation which results
from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his
behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other to so act." RESTATEmENT
(SECoND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). It is only necessary to show that the agent acted at the
request of the foreign principal. Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 668 F.2d 159, 161
(2d Cir. 1982).
22 U.S.C. § 611(e).
8 Id.
- 22 U.S.C. § 611(0.
89 22 U.S.C. § 611(a), (m).
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c. Entities Organized Under the Laws of or With a Principal
Place of Business in a Foreign Country
This subsection is a catchall category for foreign corporations,
associations, organizations, or other combinations of individuals
either organized under the laws of a foreign country or having a
principal place of business there.90 This section would prevent a
foreign corporation from incorporating in the United States as a
"dummy corporation" for the purpose of not being required to
register under FARA-if that corporation has its principal place
of business abroad, the registration requirements of FARA would
still be triggered.
d. Indirect Foreign Principals
This section provides that if a person's activities are directly or
indirectly supervised, controlled, financed, or subsidized by a for-
eign principal (any of the three aforementioned categories), then
the person is a foreign principal. 91 The purpose of this section is
to prevent foreign principals from using American intermediaries
to supervise their agents in order to hide their activities and avoid
registration under FARA. With this broadly defined meaning of
"foreign principal," there is usually little question that the agent
of any given foreign actor is subject to FARA's registration re-
quirements.92
2. Agent of a Foreign Principal
A person becomes the "agent of a foreign principal" when he
or she acts at the order, request, or under the direct control of a
foreign principal and engages in any of four categories of activities
on the principal's behalf. 93 The direction or control need not be
direct; control through an intermediary seems to be sufficient.
94
Moreover, the agency relationship need not arise from an express
contract or monetary benefit conferred upon the agent; the test is
whether the relationship warrants registration by the agent to carry
out the informative purposes of FARA.9
22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(3).
9' 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1).
92 LEGAL GuiE, supra note 56, at 46-47.
93 22 U.S.C. § 611(c).
9" Id.
11 Irish N. Aid, 668 F.2d at 161.
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The four categories of activity that bring a person within the
definition of "agent of a foreign principal" include 1) political
activity, 2) public relations activity, 3) solicitation, collection, and
disbursement of funds, and 4) representation before governmental
institutions .96
a. Political Activity
Political activity, as defined in FARA, is any attempt to influ-
ence the foreign or domestic policy of the United States. 97 Political
activity not only includes attempts to change United States policy,
but also includes attempts to maintain the status quo as well. 98
Political activity does not include routine inquiries of government
officials concerning current policy or seeking admimstrative action
in a matter where current policy is not in question.99
b. Public Relations Activity
FARA lists four types of public relations activity that bring a
person within the definition of agent of a foreign principal when
these activities are carried out for a foreign benefactor. These four
types of activities are: 1) acting as a public relations counsel, 1" 2)
acting as a publicity agent, 10 3) acting as an information service
employee,) 2 and 4) acting as a political consultant. 103
22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)(i)-(iv).
22 U.S.C. § 611(o).
11 S. REP No. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965); H.R. REP No. 1470, 89th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 6 (1966); 28 C.F.R. § 5.100(e) (1988).
28 C.F.R. § 5.100(e).
10o Public relations counsel is defined as "any person who engaged directly or indirectly
in informing, advising, or in any way representing a principal in any public relations matter
pertaining to political or public interests, policies, or relations of such principal." 22 U.S.C.
§ 611(g).
10, Publicity agent is defined as "any person who engages directly or indirectly in the
publication or dissemination of oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or
matter of any kind, including publication by means of advertising, books, periodicals,
newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or otherwise." 22 U.S.C. § 611(h).
101 Information service employee is defined as:
[A]ny person who is engaged in furnishing, disseminating, or publishing ac-
counts, descriptions, information, or data with respect to the political, indus-
tnal, employment, economic, social, cultural, or other benefits, advantages,
facts, or conditions of any country other than the United States, or of any
government of a foreign country or of a foreign political party or of a
partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combination of
individuals organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of
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c. Solicitation, Collection, and Disbursement of Funds
A person is required to register as an agent of a foreign
principal when he or she solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses
contributions, loans, money, or anything of value on behalf of
that foreign principal. 104 This section serves to inform the public
where their money is going when they make contributions to a
person collecting funds for a foreign cause. 0 5
d. Representation Before Government Institutions
Most relevant to our analysis of the problem of insider lobbying
by former federal officials is FARA's fourth category of activity
that brings a person under the defimtion of "agent of a foreign
principal" -representing the interests of a foreign principal before
any agencyi1° or official'07 of the United States government.
3. Exemptions Under FARA
FARA provides that certain occupations and certain activities
shall be exempted from its registration requirements. Despite the
existence of an agency relationship with a foreign principal, some
persons can claim legitimate exemptions under the Act.
business in, a foreign country.
22 U.S.C. § 611(i).
10, Political consultant is defined as "any person who engages in informing or advising
any other person with reference to the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or
the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a foreign country or of a foreign
political party." 22 U.S.C. § 611(p).
10 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(iii).
' This was the issue in Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 530 F Supp. 241
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 159 (2nd Cir. 1982). In this case, the Attorney General
was successful in getting a ruling that the Irish Northern Aid Committee had to register as
a foreign agent.
The Committee argued that it was merely a relief organization for human suffering in
Northern Ireland and thus exempt from registration under FARA as merely a private and
nonpolitical actor as provided for in §613(d). The Attorney General prevailed in his argument
that in reality the Committee was a front to raise money for the Irish Republican Army
and thus the Committee would not be able to claim exemption from FARA as a nonpolitical
actor.
106 Agency is defined in federal regulations as "every unit in the Executive and Legis-
lative branches of Government of the United States, including committees of both Houses
of Congress." 28 C.F.R. § 5.100(c).
-07 Official is defined in federal regulations as "[m]embers and officers of both Houses
of Congress as well as officials in the Executive branch of Government in the United
States." 28 C.F.R. § 5.100(d).
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FARA provides for four exempted occupations and three ex-
empted activities.108 The four exempted occupations are:
a. accredited diplomatic or consular officers of a foreign coun-
try; 109
b. foreign government officials; °10
c. staff members of diplomatic or consular officers;"' and
d. attorneys who represent foreign interests.1
2
The three exempted activities are:
a. religious, scholastic, or scientific pursuits;"
3
b. private- and nonpolitical activities;" 4 and
"0, 22 U.S.C. § 613.
" 22 U.S.C. § 613(a). The diplomatic or consular official must be accredited by the
State Department to qualify for the exemption. Accreditation occurs when the official is
formally recognized by the Secretary of State. 28 C.F.R. § 5.301(a). The recognition is
personal only and does not extend to an office, a bureau, or any other entity. 28 C.F.R. §
5.301(b) (1988). The scope of the exemption is limited to the individual's official functions
as a diplomatic or consular officer. 22 U.S.C. § 613(a) (1982).
I10 22 U.S.C. § 613(b) (1982). The same restrictions as those for diplomatic or consular
officials apply. To qualify for the exemption, the status and character of duties of a foreign
government official must be on public record with the State Department. The exemption
does not apply if -the official is also a public relations counsel, publicity agent, or U.S.
citizen.
" 22 U.S.C. § 613(c). The same restrictions for officials of foreign governments apply.
117 22 U.S.C. § 613(g). The attorney exemption does not apply to activity aimed, at
influencing government policy.
Attorneys placed considerable pressure on Congress to enact the attorney exemption
in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Rabinowitz v. Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605
(1964). See supra note 79. The Court held that an attorney representing Cuban interests
would have to register under FARA since his activities were "political in nature." The
attorney exemption essentially nullifies the Rabinowitz decision. The attorney exemption
applies when an attorney represents a disclosed foreign principal before the courts or
administrative agencies in both formal and informal proceedings. 22 U.S.C. § 613(g).
In Attorney Gen. v. Covington and Burling, 411 F Supp. 371 (D.D.C. 1976), inj.
denied, 430 F Supp. 1117 (D.D.C. 1977), the court held that the law firm of Covington
and Burling, which was a registered agent of the Republic of Guinea, could claim the
attorney-client privilege to withhold certain documents from its FARA registration state-
ments. Id. at 377. The court, however, reserved for itself the decision as to which documents
the privilege would affect. Id. at 377. See Paul, Lawyers, Privileged, supra note 68, at 758.
"3 22 U.S.C. § 613(e). The Attorney General has restricted the scope of this exemption
by making it unavailable to persons who engage in political activity for or on behalf of a
foreign principal. 28 C.F.R. § 5.304(d). This restriction serves to prevent foreign actors
from cloaking their activities through the guise of a scholastic, scientific, or religious
"front." Id.
114 22 U.S.C. § 613(d). There are three categories for this exemption:
1. Activities that are private, nonpolitical, and in furtherance of bona fide trade or
commerce. 22 U.S.C. § 613(d)(1) (1982). This exemption most often applies to businessmen
carrying out commercial activity that does not involve foreign governmental interests. Note,
The Foreign Agents Registration Act: When is Registration Required, 34 S.C.L. REv 687,
697-98 (1983). The exemption may also apply where a business executive is doing business
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c. acts of agents of foreign governments vital to the defense of
the Umted States."1
5
4. FARA's Registration Requirements
Every agent of a foreign principal must (1) file a registration
statement with the Attorney General; ' 6 (2) file two copies of all
with a foreign government, as long as the business executive does not directly promote the
public or political interests of the foreign government. 28 C.F.R. § 5.304(b). Congress was
aware that many foreign business enterpnses are owned by foreign governments. Congress
did not want to require U.S. businesses to register under FARA in order to be able to do
business with these enterprises. See S. REP. No. 143, supra note 98, at 11; H.R. REP. No.
1470, supra note 98, at 10. Where an enterprise is so closely related to the interest of a
foreign government (i.e., that enterprise accounts for mnety percent of the nation's exports),
the exemption may not apply. Id.
Trade or commerce is usually defined to include the "exchange, transfer, purchase, or
sale of commodities, service, or property of any kind." 28 C.F.R. § 5.304(a).
2. Activities not serving predominantly a foreign interest. 22 U.S.C. § 613(d)(2). This
provision was designed to exclude from registration both U.S. compames with foreign
subsidiaries and foreign companies with U.S. subsidiaries. Paul, The Foreign Agents Reg-
istration Act: The New Amendments, 22 Bus. LAW 601, 608-11 (1967); O'Hara, The
Foreign Agents Registration Act--"The Spotlight of Pitiless Publicity, 10 ViLL. L. Rv.
435, 452 (1965); Note, supra, at 699-700. The complexities of what types of activity are
covered by this section are beyond the scope of this article.
3. The activity of groups who solicit and collect funds within the United States for
medical aid and assistance or for food and clothing to relieve human suffenng is exempt
from registration under FARA. 22 U.S.C. § 613(d)(3).
I' 22 U.S.C. § 613(0. Agents whose pnncipals are nations whose defense is vital to
the defense of the United States are exempt from registration if they meet the three
requirements for the exemption:
1. The agent must engage in activities which mutually promote the defense of the
United States and the foreign government;
2. The agent must disseminate only accurate and truthful information; and
3. The foreign government must notify the Secretary of State of the agent's identity
and activity.
For the exemption to apply, the President must have designated the foreign nation as
one vital to the defense of the United States. 28 C.F.R. § 5.305. Currently, there is no such
designation in force for any nation. LEGAL GuiDE, supra note 56, at 96. The exemption is
revocable by the Attorney General at the request or with the approval of the Secretary of
State. Id.
116 22 U.S.C. § 612. The registration statement must include the following information:
1. The registrant's name and personal and business address.
2. A complete list of the agent's employees and a description of the nature of their
work.
3. Copies of all written agreements between the pnncipal and the agent.
4. Terms of all oral agreements between the principal and the agent.
5. Methods employed or to be employed to perform the agent's duties.
6. Any political activities.
7. Other persons for whom the agent is acting.
8. Money paid to the agent from the principal within 60 days of the agency and money
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political propaganda that was transmitted through the Umted States
mails or through other means of interstate commerce with the
Attorney General;' 7 and (3) keep books of account and other
disbursed on behalf of the agent in the 60 days prior to the agency.
9. Any other information that the Attorney General deems necessary (for reasons of
national security and the public interest) to be disclosed.
22 U.S.C. § 612(a)(l)-(11).
After the initial registration statement, the agent is required to file supplemental
statements every six months. 22 U.S.C. § 612(b). The agent must give the Attorney General
notice within ten days if the nature of his work changes. Id.
The Attorney General has the power to:
I. Review the registration statements and supplements to see if they are complete and
accurate.
2. Return registration statements to agents and order any deficiencies to be corrected.
3. Seek injunctive and/or criminal relief against any registrant refusing to complete a
deficient statement. Injunctive relief would bar agents from performing their agency duties
until they comply with the request to correct deficiencies. Criminal penalties for noncom-
pliance include fines of $10,000 maximum and/or five years maximum imprisonment. 22
U.S.C. § 618 (1982). The Attorney General's office has not pushed for imprisonment in
cases it has prosecuted. Defendants tend to plea bargain and receive suspended fines if they
comply with the Act. See Attorney Gen. v. Arab Information Center, Ca. No. 76-279
(D.D.C. 1976) (A consent decree was entered into with the Attorney General not to violate
the Act. The consent decree neither denied nor admitted the allegations made.). See also
Attorney Gen. v. United States Japan Council, Inc., Ca. No. 76-1290 (1976).
117 22 U.S.C. § 614 (1976). The agent has up to 48 hours after the beginning of the
transmittal to file, with the Attorney General, two copies of the propaganda and a statement
describing to whom and where it was disseminated. 22 U.S.C. § 614(a) (1982). FARA
defines political propaganda as
any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communication or ex-
pression by any person, (1) which is reasonably adapted to, or which the
person disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to, prevail
upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a recipient
or any section of the public within the United States with reference to the
political or public interests, policies, or relations of a foreign country or a
foreign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United
States or promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions,
or (2) which advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social,
political, or religious disorder, civil not, or other conflict involving the use of
force or violence in any other American republic or the overthrow of any
government or political subdivision of any other American republic by any
means involving the use of force or violence. 22 U.S.C. § 611() (1982).
If an agent does transmit propaganda or cause it to be transmitted, the propaganda must
be conspicuously marked at its beginning with (or prefaced with or accompanied by) an
accurate statement of the relationship between the transmitter of the propaganda and the
propaganda itself. 22 US.C. § 614(b) (1976). The propaganda must also inform its recipient
that the disseminator is a foreign agent and that the United States does not condone his or
her statements. Id. The propaganda must also inform the recipient that a copy of all
political propaganda disseminated by the foreign agent is available for public inspection. 22
U.S.C. § 614(c) (1976).
The agent's entire registration statement is open to the public and available for
inspection in Washington; alternatively, a copy may be sent by mail from the Foreign
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written records of all activities required to be disclosed by the
Act.1
18
III. THE ETHICS iN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978
The other statute that would affect lobbying activities of ex-
government officials on behalf of foreign principals is the Ethics
in Government Act of 1978;119 specifically, the provisions of Title
V of the act that restrict post-employment activity of ex-govern-
ment officials. 20
A. Legislative History
Although the Ethics in Government Act has only been law
since 1978, the roots of federal ethics legislation go back to the
mid-nieteenth century 121 In the wake of numerous scandals in-
volving the corruption of federal government officials, the first
criminal statutes were enacted to deal with several categories of
official misconduct. Those categories were:
1. Activities of current or former federal employees on behalf of
others with respect to claims before the courts or federal agencies.
2. Dealing in official transactions with businesses in which the
employee has a financial interest.
3. Accepting pay from nongovernment sources "in connection
with" official duties.
4. Assisting another, for pay, in receiving a government con-
tract. 22
Impetus for change in the old statutes came in the early 1960's
due to the efforts of the Association of the Bar of the City of
Agents Registration Office, 22 U.S.C. § 614(c) (1982), The Attorney General also publishes
an annual synopsis of registration statements filed during the past year. U.S. Department
of Justice, Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the
Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended for (the current)
calendar year.
,, 22 U.S.C. § 615 (1982).
,, Ethics in Government Act of 1978, P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat, 1824 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 701 (1978)).
m 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982).
121 R. VAUGHN, CoNFLICT-OF-INTEREsT REGULATION IN THE FEDERAL ExEcuTwE BRANCH
I1 (1979).
"I ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CInY OF NEw YoRKc, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND
THE FEDERAL SERVICE 28 (1960) [hereinafter BAR STUDY].
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New York and the Kennedy administration. 123 New York's Bar
Study concluded that the old statutes were in need of revision
because they were poorly drafted and lacked coordination, focused
on areas of government activity where the risk of corruption had
become insigmficant, and finally did not contemplate large modern
government structures and complex bureaucratic procedures and
regulations.' 24 Thus, the existing statutes were overhauled to deal
with the realities of present-day government.12
With the 1962 statutes came the first broad provisions restrict-
ing the post-employment activities of former government employ-
ees. 26 The sentiment in Congress at that time was that the individual
federal agencies' ethical rules on post-employment activity were
inadequate protection against the "revolving door" effect of high
officials leaving government to take lucrative positions with the
industries they once regulated.' 27
The House passed a bill in August 1961 that included two post-
employment restrictions. 2s The first was a permanent ban on em-
ployees representing private parties on matters in which their par-
ticipation was "personal and substantial."'' 29 Personal and
'2 B. MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW 5 (1964). For a fuller discussion
of the legislative history of federal criminal ethics statutes, see id. at 273. See also R.
ROBERTS, WITE HOUSE ETrcs-Tim HISTORY OF TIE POLITICS OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST
REGULATION (1988).
'12 BAR STUDY, supra note 122, at 180-82.
'5 The revised conflict of interest statutes are codified today as Title 18 U.S.C. §§
201-219, 24 (1982), Chapter 11, Bribery, Graft, and Conflict of Interest.
12 Act of Oct. 23, 1962, P.L. 87-849, § 1(a), 76 Stat. 1126, 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-218
(1962). Former § 284 of Title 18 provided a narrow post-employment restnction that only
prevented a former employee from representing a party involving a specific contract or
claim against the United States that the employee had worked on while in office. The
narrow scope of § 284 was underscored by the decision of a federal distnct judge in United
States v. Bergson, 119 F Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1954). In that case, the court held that "claims
against the United States" were limited to demands for money or property. Id. at 468. The
court held that this language did not encompass defendant's action of applying to the
antitrust division of the Justice Department (a division he used to head) to obtain a clearance
letter for a merger for a firm on whose cases he had worked during his tenure in office.
Id. at 468. 18 U.S.C. § 284 was repealed by the 1962 Act.
,27 During the hearings on revision of federal ethics rules, the Chairman of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, Congressman Emmanual Celler, compared agency enforcement
of ethics rules to putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop. He further remarked to a
colleague on the committee that, "the longer you remain here, the more you will realize
that you cannot expect the agency to enforce conflict of interest statutes through admins-
trative sanctions you just will not get anywhere." Federal Conflict of Interest Legis-
lation: Hearings on H.R. 2157, H.R. 1900, H.R. 7556 & H.R. 10575 Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 392 (1960).
's H.R. 8140.
129 Id.
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substantial participation could take the form of an approval, dis-
approval, recommendation, decision, or rendering of advice.3 0 The
second was a two year bar on a former employee representing
anyone on a matter that was within the employee's "official re-
sponsibility" 131
After passage of the House bill, federal agencies began to
protest that the new post-employment restrictions would cause a
mass exodus from federal service and hamper personnel recruitment
for federal agencies.1 32 The opposition of the federal agencies slowed
Senate action on the bill during the remainder of 1961.133 The
eventual Senate version of the bill cut the two year disqualification
period on matters under a former employee's "official responsi-
bility" to one year, and added a number of exemptions for inter-
mittent employees such as consultants and advisers.
134
The House accepted the Senate version of the bill without
change. 135 President Kennedy signed the bill into law on October
23, 1962, and it took effect on January 21, 1963.136
The 1962 Act set forth two post-employment restrictions. First,
a former federal employee could never act as agent or attorney in
any "particular matter involving a specific party or parties" that
involves the United States and in which the person participated
"personally and substantially" as a federal employee. 37 For ex-
ample, suppose A was an official of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. During A's tenure in office, suppose that A participated both
personally and substantially in an admimstrative adjudication in-
volving the XYZ Corporation. Thus after A leaves the FTC, he
would be barred from acting as attorney or agent for the XYZ
Corporation in connection with the specific subject matter of that
admimstrative adjudication. While on its face this seemed like a
broad restriction, its scope was somewhat limited because it only
applied to adversarial proceedings and not to general rule-mak-
1 R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 97.
131 Id.
3I Id. at 98.
133 Id.
'11 Id. at 99. The Kennedy admimstration pressured for these exemptions, saying that
consultants and advisers would be held to the same high standard that the admimstration
had already set for other federal employees under the already existing conflict of interest
rules, laws, and regulations.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2), (3) (1962).
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ing. 38 The permanent bar did not apply to giving advice or assis-
tance on a matter the former employee had dealt with personally,
so long as that advice or assistance was not in the capacity of
agent or attorney 139
The second post-employment restriction under the 1962 Act
was a one year ban on appearing personally, as agent or attorney,
in a particular matter involving specific parties in which the United
States is involved that was actually pending during the former
employee's tenure in office, and that was under the former em-
ployee's "official responsibility "40 "Official responsibility" was
defined as direct administrative or operating authority to approve,
disapprove, or direct government action. 141 The authority could be
either intermediate or final, lone or joint, and either personal or
through subordinates; the definition had the bureaucratic chain of
command in mind. 42 The effect of the one year bar was limited
since it only applied to matters actually pending during the former
employee's tenure; if any new matter arose, the former employee
was free to appear as agent or attorney even though the matter
was of a type that was once under his or her official responsibil-
ity 143
A third restriction under the 1962 Act applied to partners of
present employees. 44 Partners of present federal employees were
barred from acting as attorney or agent in any particular matter
involving specific parties that involve the United States, and in
which the employee was currently participating or in which the
employee had personally and substantially participated.
41
The last major revision of the federal criminal conflict of
interest statutes came during the Carter admimstration through the
vehicle of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. During the
presidential election campaign of 1976, candidate Jimmy Carter
stressed the restoration of public confidence in the integrity of
government as a primary goal. 146 In the wake of the Watergate
- Petrowitz, Conflict of Interest in Federal Procurement, 29 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
196, 206 (1964).
i" R. VAuGHN, supra note 121, at 15.
18 U.S.C. § 207(b).
1,' 18 U.S.C. § 202(b).
142 Id., R. VAuOHN, supra note 121, at 15.
", R. VAUGHN, supra note 121, at 15.
18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1962).
141 Id. The criminal liability of partners was expressly limited to the language of 18
U.S.C. § 207(c).
'4 R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 147.
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scandals of the early 1970's, the public's trust in the federal gov-
ernment and its officials had been severely shaken. In a speech to
the American Bar Association, Carter outlined his support for new
laws to limit the movement of persons employed by federal regu-
latory agencies into the industries they once regulated. 147
In January 1977, after his election victory, President-elect Carter
announced new ethical guidelines for semor political nominees,
which included a requirement that his nominees agree to make no
formal or informal appearance before their former agency after
leaving office. 148 Under the 1962 conflict of interest statutes, the
permanent bar only applied to formal proceedings.1 49 The Carter
guidelines were a precursor to new ethics legislation being prepared
for introduction in Congress.
On May 3, 1977, the White House introduced the Ethics. in
Government Act.150 While Congress had tried to enact ethics reform
legislation in the aftermath of Watergate, nothing of substance had
been achieved.' 5 ' The Ethics in Government Act proposed the
creation of an Office of Government Ethics, located within the
Civil Service Administration, along with new restrictions on post-
employment activities of government officials. 15 2 The ethics office
was to have four responsibilities:
47 N.Y. Times, August 10, 1976, at 15, col. 1.
"I N.Y. Times, January 5, 1977, at 1, 17.
"9 See 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (1962). Formal proceedings included judicial or other
proceedings, applications, requests for a ruling or other deterrmnation, contracts, claims,
controversies, charges, accusations, arrests, or other particular matters involving a specific
party or parties in which the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.
Reaction to the new Carter guidelines was mixed. Lobbying orgamzations such as
Common Cause praised the new guidelines as "a major breakthrough in the fight to
eliminate conflicts of interest in the executive branch." N.Y. Times, January 5, 1977, at
16. A New York Times editonal expressed concern over the potential impact on recruitment
of talented persons by federal agencies once potential applicants considered the post-
employment restnctions to which they would be subjected. The Even Interest of All the
People, N.Y. Times, January 8, 1977, at 18. See R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 149.
1o 123 CoNo. Rlc. S13328-S13329 (daily ed. May 3, 1977) (message to Congress by
President Jimmy Carter regarding the Ethics in Government Act).
"I R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 152. The Watergate Ethics Reform Act of 1975 had
provided for the establishment of an Office of Independent Public Attorney, outside of the
Justice Department to investigate ethics charges against high government officials. Water-
gate, Part I. Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on S.495 Before the Comm.
on Government Operations, 94th Cong., ist Sess. (1975). The Watergate Reform Act of
1976 provided additional requirements for financial disclosure by high officials as well as
the revolving-door issue. The Senate passed legislation on these issues in July 1976, but the
House failed to act on it. CoNo. Q. ALMANAC, 423 (1976).
2 Message to Congress, supra note 150.
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(1) issuing general conflict of interest guidelines;
(2) making recommendations to the President on proposed changes
in ethics rules;
(3) monitoring individual and agency compliance with ethics rules;
and
(4) directing the government-wide ethics program."'
The office was not, however, vested with full jurisdiction over
criminal and civil conflicts of interest.1 54 The Ethics Office would
have the power only to administer the ethics program and order
corrective action by agencies or individuals; the Justice Department
would retain final authority over criminal investigations. 55 The
White House and the Justice Department did not want to centralize
ethics responsibility in the new office; its function was to coordi-
nate, while day-to-day management was left to agencies and inves-
tigations were left to Justice. 1
56
With respect to the new post-employment restrictions in Cart-
er's proposed Act, his recommendations were 1) the extension of
the one year ban on appearing before an agency on a particular
matter that was under the former employee's "official responsibil-
ity" to two years; and (2) a ban on former high officials contacting
their former agency in any representative capacity on any matter
for one year.157 A final sigmficant provision of the proposed Act
was the establishment of a special prosecutor to investigate charges
of misconduct by high officials.""
Senate hearings on the Ethics in Government Act along with
the Public Officials Integrity Act (S. 555) began in May 1977 59
Supporters of the Carter proposals testified that there was a need
for stronger post-employment restrictions, but there was a danger
in over-regulating and thus eliminating the necessary regulatory
flexibility to deal with complex conflict of interest issues.' 60
M' R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 153.
"4 Id.
-4 H.R. 6954.
,16 R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 153. It was also unclear how the director of the
Ethics Office would administer any sanctions for ethics violations; presumably, he or she
would have to ask the President to punish or dismiss the transgressor.
57 Id. at 154. The Carter proposals were weaker than anticipated; many observers had
expected an across the board prohibition on former officials taking jobs with employers
with whom they had substantial dealings during their official tenure.
1' Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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The Senate passed the Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977
on July 27th. It mandated the creation of an Ethics Office of the
'Civil Service Administration, the appointment of special prosecu-
tors to investigate ethics charges against high officials, and revisions
of the post-employment provisions that went beyond the Carter
proposals.16,
The Senate bill expanded the disqualification period for matters
under a former employee's "official responsibility" from one to
two years. 62 The bill also created a new ban that prohibited high
officials from contacting their former agency on any matter for
one year.'0 Additionally, the bill authorized both criminal penalties
as well as adminstrative authority for agencies to disbar a former
employee for violations of post-employment restrictions for up to
five years.' 64 The sharpest conflict between the Senate and the
Carter administration was over defining activity that would be
covered by ihe lifetime ban.
The Senate post-employment revisions changed the lifetime ban
on acting as attorney or agent on matters where the former em-
ployee participated personally and substantially 165 The revision
expanded the ban to include informal as well as formal proceed-
ings. 166 Carter had not wanted the ban to apply to all forms of
aiding and assisting outside of informal and formal proceedings,
i.e., to so-called "behind the scenes assistance."' 67 The language
tbt the Senate adopted, however, reflected its intent to include
exactly that sort of behind the scenes help given to private interests
on matters with which the former employee had worked on while
in o.ffice.' 68 The Carter administration was hoping that the House
would water down the belund the scenes provisions.'
69
When the bill arrived in the House, widespread disagreement
arose, partly due to the fact that parts of the bill fell under the
,6, Id. at 156.
" Id., 18 U.S.C. § 207(b). The aiding and assistance prohibition was limited to aid
and assstapce rendered at government proceedings.
' Id., 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(d).
I6+ d., 18 U.S.C. § 207(j).
6, 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1978).
16 R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 156.
167 Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, Blind Trusts and Other Conflict of Interest
Matters: Hearings on S. 555 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 7-8 (1977) (message to Congress from President Carter indicating his
support for the strengthening of government ethical standards).
I6 R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 156.
169 Id.
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jurisdiction of four committees. 170 With respect to the post-em-
ployment provisions of the bill, Carter successfully persuaded the
House Judiciary Committee to delete the lifetime bar on behind
the scenes assistance and replace it with a two year bar with respect
to matters in which the former employee's participation was per-
sonal and substantial.1
71
The scope of the post-employment restrictions also troubled
the Judiciary Committee. 72 Under the Carter proposals, the re-
strictions would apply to executive-level positions, political appoint-
ees classified at GS-16 or above, military officers in grade 0-6 or
above, and others designated as having significant decision-making
or rule-making authority by the director of the Ethics Office.
73
The White House and the Justice Department were able to convince
the House Judiciary committee that allowing the director of the
Ethics Office to designate who would be subject to post-employ-
ment rules would not be an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive authority 174
A further point of debate over the post-employment restrictions
was the threshold issue of whether they were warranted at all.
Several members of the Judiciary Committee criticized the Carter
administration's "naive attempt to deal with what it perceives as
the problem of the 'revolving door' in Government service.' 1 75
These critics described the one year disqualification period as par-
ticularly punitive and argued that the Carter reforms would "ham-
per the ability of federal Government to attract bright, young
people, as well as experienced professionals, for high-level posi-
tions.' ' 76 This dissension over the content of the Act, jurisdictional
battles between committees, and federal agency pressure on the
White House to moderate its reform package combined to prevent
passage of the Act during the rest of 1977 177
170 Id. The bill fell under the jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Ethics, the Post
Office and Civil Service Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the House Judiciary
Committee.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 158.
173 HousE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, Ethics in Government Act of 1977, H.R. REP. No.
800, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1977).
174 Letter from Larry A. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Chairman
E. Damelson (October 7, 1977). See R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 159.
171 See supra note 173, at 102.
176 Id. at 104. See R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 159.
I" R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 159. To mollify critics who accused the Congress
of foot-dragging on the ethics issue, the House passed a number of rules that (1) required
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In September 1978, the debate over ethics legislation resumed
in the House.'7 8 The eventual House bill was similar to the Senate's
and gave the White House most of what it wanted, but there were
some important changes made in the House. 
79
The Defense Department had voiced concerns that post-em-
ployment restrictions would hamper the flow of scientific and
techmcal information between former officials working for con-
tractors and the government. 80 Thus, a compromise was struck
that would allow former officials to obtain exemptions from the
post-employment restrictions on a case-by-case basis.18 1 Congress-
man Samuel Stratton, however, argued that, even with the case-
by-case exemption scientists would still leave government service in
droves because they would not know if they would get an exemp-
tion until after leaving government employment. 8 2 Stratton suc-
ceeded in getting an amendment to the Act that exempted "the
making of commumcations solely for the purpose of furnishing
scientific or technological information" from the mandates of the
Act. 183
A further point of controversy was over proposed amendments
to the one year ban on contact with the former agency by a high
official.8 4 House opponents of the ban succeeded in passing an
amendment that created an exemption allowing agencies to waive
the ban for some former officials who were members of a licensed
profession in good standing. 15 The effect of this amendment was
to effectively gut the anti-contact provision of the Act.
186
The House eventually passed its version of the Act on Septem-
ber 30, 1978, after lengthy debate. 18 7 It took nearly one month for
its members to disclose their financial holdings, (2) attempted to curb abuses of perks and
privileges of office, and (3) proposed a cap on outside income. Iromcally, these measures
designed to placate the public have today set the stage for an etucs scandal with a life of
its own. The recent ethics charges and subsequent resignation of House Speaker Jim Wright
have shifted the focus on ethics from the executive branch to the Congress.
" Id. at 160.
" Id.
190 Id.
is' Id.
3 24 CONG. Rac. 31,983 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978).
,S) Id., The Stratton amendment became codified as 18 U.S.C. § 207(f).
"4 R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 160.
,s 124 CONG. Rc. H31,973-32,033 (daily ed. Sept. 27 1978) (detailing the passage of
the Ethics in Government Act of 1977 by the House of Representatives).
"4 R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 161.
197 Id.
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the House and Senate to iron out their differences in conference. 188
On the issue of post-employment restrictions, the conference agreed
to delete the House exception to the one year no contact rule; they
inserted instead a limit on the rule so that it would only apply to
executive level officials and others designated by the director of
the Ethics Office as having significant decision-making or super-
visory responsibility 189 President Carter signed the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act on October 28, 1978.190
With passage of the Act came a fire-storm of protest from the
federal agencies, particularly with respect to the new section
207(b)(ii) of Title 18, which provided for a two year disqualification
period on "aiding, assisting, counseling, or representing" anyone
on a matter in which they participated personally and substan-
tially 191 Momentum in Congress began to build to amend or repeal
the post-employment portions of the Act, while steadfast support-
ers of the Act dug in their heels for a fight. 92
188 Id.
889 Id. at 162.
190 37 CONG. Q. WKLY. 3121-24 (1978).
"I R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 163-64. The Washington Post reported that hundreds
of government officials were planning to quit before the Act became effective to avoid the
post-employment restrictions of the Act. Washington Post, January 31, 1979, at A3, col.
1. Members of the Carter administration, notably then Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare Joseph Califano, asked the President to postpone the effective date of the law and
give Congress time to clarify or amend the post-employment restrictions. N.Y. Times,
March 8, 1979, at Al, col. 1. The Defense Department was most vocal in its criticism of
the Act as "a disaster," "blatantly unfair," and a "slap in the face" to officials who had
expected to be employed by defense contractors upon leaving the government service. The
Disastrous Ethics in Government Law, AnR FORCE MAGAZINE (Feb. 1979). The DOD further
argued that the post-employment restrictions would burden the defense industry with a loss
of valuable expertise. Id.
192 R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 164, 165. Senator Patrick Moynihan was quoted as
saying:
I simply wish to state that I think we passed a law that had much more in it
than we originally realized, and that in the name of ethics in Government we
are making service to Government impossible for ethical people. I think
we had better pay attention to it before we look up and suddenly find that
we have not only lost so many absolutely indispensible people, but that we
cannot replace them.
125 CONG. REc. S1400 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979). On the other hand, Senator Abraham
Ribicoff defended the post-employment restrictions, saying that Congress had no intention
to "prevent a Federal employee from taking any position with any firm or orgamzation
which he chooses when he leaves the government." Congress only intended to apply the
two year aiding and assisting bar to "those matters in which a former high ranking official
had been personally and substantially involved" and not matters that may have merely been
under the former employee's official responsibility. 125 CONG. REc. S2898 (daily ed. Feb.
21, 1979) (statements contained in the cover letter of the Memorandum on the "Aiding and
Assisting in Representing" Provision of 18 U.S.C. § 207(b)).
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In April 1979, the White House proposed a series of technical
amendments to section 207(b) to clarify the application of the
aiding and assisting rule. 193 The most significant of these amend-
ments was to narrow the scope of the "aiding and assisting"
prohibition to exempt any behind the scenes activity not part of a
formal or informal proceeding. 9 4 In hearings on the amendment
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Administrative Law and
Government Relations, adrmistration representatives testified that
including behind the scenes assistance would leave former officials
wide open to scurrilous charges of what they said behind closed
doors. 95 The Senate passed the administration's technical amend-
ments on April 9, 1979 196
The amendment package then went to the House, where the
White House added additional amendments to win swift ap-
proval.' 97 These additional amendments included (1) an exemption
for high officials leaving the federal service for positions in higher
education, medical research and treatment facilities, or state and
local governments'9" and (2) further limitations on the number of
persons automatically covered by the one year no contact ban.199
The House passed the amendment package and 'President Carter
signed the amendments into law on June 15, 1979 200
B. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978
Title V of the Ethics in Government Act deals with the post-
employment restrictions whose legislative history has been discussed
above. Title V had the objectives of: (1) insuring government
efficiency; (2) eliminating official corruption; (3) promoting even-
handed exercise of administrative discretion; (4) preventing the
exercise of undue influence of former officials with their former
193 CoNG. Q. WKLY 631 (1971). The White House also issued a series of interim
regulations defining the limits of permissible contact under the new post-employment re-
strictions of 18 U.S.C. § 207 5 C.F.R. § 737. See R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 165.
19, R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 165.
,91 125 CONG. REc. S7141-42 (daily ed. April 4, 1979) (testimony of Alan Campbell,
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, previously given at a hearing before the
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Adnumstrative Law and Government Relations and later
introduced to the Senate).
196 37 CONG. Q. WKiY. 767 (1979).
"' R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 166.
,' 37 Co G. Q. WKLY. 1033 (1979).
19 R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 166.
37 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1246 (1979).
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agency colleagues; (5) creating a realistic mechanism to punish
official corruption; (6) providing a standard of ethical conduct for
former officials; and (7) avoiding even the appearance of impro-
priety of public office being used for personal or private gain.
201
The post-employment restrictions of Title V of the Ethics in
Government Act are often perceived as a radical revision of conflict
of interest law They are actually a modification of the pre-existing
criminal conflict of interest statutes dating back to the Kennedy
administration. To understand what Title V of the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act entailed, it is helpful to explain it in terms of how it
changed the previous statutory scheme.
With respect to the lifetime ban, the Ethics in Government Act
provided that no one could act as attorney or agent or otherwise
represent any other person, in any particular matter, concerning
specific parties, that involves the United States as a party, and in
which the former employee's participation was both personal and
substantial. 20 2 The Act broadened the pre-existing lifetime ban by
including informal as well as formal proceedings. 203 The Act further
expanded the lifetime ban by including appearances in any profes-
sional capacity, and not just appearances as attorney or agent. 204
The two year disqualification provision of the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act also substantially broadened the pre-existing conflict
of interest provisions of Title 18.205 The two year ban is divided
into two categories of prohibited activity The first prohibited
category is acting as attorney, agent, or otherwise representing a
person on a matter that fell within the former employee's "official
201 P.L. 95-21, at 31-32.
18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1978). A recent study by the President's Commission on Federal
Ethics Law Reform recommended that § 207(a) be amended to add a two year ban on the
use or disclosure of certain nonpublic information by a former official for purposes of
aiding or advising a party in a representation that is subject to § 207(a). To Serve With
Honor: Report of the President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform 61 (1989)
[hereinafter Serve With Honor].
203 18 U.S.C. § 207(a). The previous § 207(a) was limited to adversarial proceedings
that included "any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other
determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, or arrest," thus excluding
informal non-adversanal proceedings. See R. VAUGHN, supra note 121, at 16 (discussing the
scope and impact of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978).
- 18 U.S.C. § 207(a). The legislative history shows that Congress intended to include
representation "in any professional capacity, whether as attorney, consultant, expert witness,
or otherwise." Joint Explanation of the Committee on Conference, 124 CoNG. Rac. 12,303,
12,306 (daily ed., Oct. I1, 1978). Making a written or oral representation with the intent
to influence is also prohibited under this provision.
05 18 U.S.C. § 207(b).
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responsibility ,,206 This category was an extension of the previous
"official responsibility" ban from one to two years. 207
The second prohibited category of activity under the two year
disqualification period is the provision against individuals know-
ingly representing or aiding, counseling, advising, consulting, or
assisting in the representation of any person by their presence at
any formal or informal proceeding on a matter in which their
participation as a government employee was both substantial and
personal. 28 This provision was an entirely new category of prohib-
ited activity under the criminal conflict of interest statutes. The
ban on aiding or assisting in representation, as opposed to actual
representation, amounts to a ban on lobbying activity Before 1978,
lobbying was never a federal crime, no matter how closely related
the lobbying issue was to the employee's activities while in office.
Thus, the new Ethics in Government Act expanded the purview of
the federal conflict of interest statutes.
Significantly, the aiding and assisting ban does not apply to all
former government employees, but to high officials only High
officials include secretaries of departments, heads of agencies, dep-
uty, under, and assistant secretaries, associate adnmstrators, and
others paid at the executive scale. 209 Also subject to the aiding and
assisting ban provisions are higher level military officers assigned
to pay grades 0-9 or above, as well as any other person that the
Ethics Office director deems as having significant enough decision-
making or supervisory responsibility to warrant being subject to
the restriction. 210
The Ethics in Government Act further provides for a one year
ban on representing any party or making an oral or written com-
- 18 U.S.C. § 207(b)(i). Official responsibility includes "the direct admimstrative or
operating authority, whether intermediate or final, and either exercisable alone or with
others, and either personally or through subordinates, to approve, disapprove, or otherwise
direct Government action." 18 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1962).
Another proposal by the President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform would
clarify the knowledge element of 18 U.S.C. § 207(b)(i) to prohibit knowing representations
as to a particular matter "which such employee knows was actually pending under his or
her official responsibility." SERVE WITH HONOR, supra note 202, at 69. As with 18 U.S.C.
§ 207(a), making a written or oral communication with the intent to influence is also a
prohibited activity under § 207(b)(i).
- 18 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1962).
- 18 U.S.C. § 207(b)(ii) (1978).
209 R. VAuOGN, supra note 121, at 16. This description is a bit of an oversimplification.
The technical breakdown of which employees are and are not covered by subsection c is
covered in exhaustive detail in 18 U.S.C. § 207(d).
210 18 U.S.C. § 207(d)(1)(B)(C) (1982).
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munication on that party's behalf to the former agencty concetnifg
any matter that is either pending bef6re the agency or in which
the agency has a direct and substantial interest. 21 This provision,
like the aiding and assisting provision, only applies io tbdt same
group of high level government officials.2 12 Congress" fntefit in
passing this provision was to limit contact with the agen y by its
former high officials for one year in order to avoid even the
"appearance of impropriety ''213
Title V also provided a number of significant exemptions to its
provisions. None of the three post-employment restrictions applies
to the making of communications solely for purposes of furnishiftg
scientific or technological information. 21 4 Similarly, nothing in Title
V prevents a former employee from giving statements under oath.2 "
Most of Title V's exemptions concern the one year ban on lhigh
officials contacting their former agency The one year ban does.
not apply to former employees who are currently workifg 1fA state
or local government, institutions of higher education, 'or libspitals
and medical research facilities. 216 The ban does not apply to Ap-
pearances or communications concerning personal and indiVidual
21 18 U.S.C. § 207(c).
212 Id. One of the proposals of the President's Commission on Ethics Reform would
be to extend the one year no contract ban to include senior employees of the legislative and
judicial branches and their senior staff. SERVE WITH HONOR, supra note 202, at 55.
With respect to the White House offices, each of the nine separate offices is eollipart-
mentalized under a 1983 ruling by the Office of Government Ethics. The nine offices, are:
the Office of Management and Budget; the Council of Economic Advisers; the Nafiinal
Security Council; the United States Trade Representative; the Council for Envfrofitnental
Quality; the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the Office of Administration; 'the,
White House Office; the Office of Policy Development; and the Office of the Vice Pre ident.
In terms of subsection c, this compartmentalization means that the one year no contact ban
only prevents former employees from contacting the specific office in which, they were
employed. The President's Commission further recommended that this ruling be bvehturned
through administrative action or legislation. Id. at 75-76.
Subsection c is unique among the post-employnent restrictions of the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act in that it excludes so-called "special employees" who only temporarily worked
for the government; the details of who is a "special employee" are explained in 18 U.S.C.
§ 202(a) (1982).
23 Joint Explanation of the Committee on Conference, 124 CONG. REc. 12,303, 12,306
(daily ed., Oct. 11, 1978).
214 18 U.S.C. § 207(f) (1978). Individuals may also be granted an exemption under-this
provision if they are highly qualified in a given scientific field and their action is deemed
in furtherance of the national interest by the director of the Ethics Office and the'head of
the agency concerned. The individual's exemption is then certified and published in: the
Federal Register.
215 18 U.S.C. § 207(h).
216 18 U.S.C. § 207(d)(2). The exemption only applies to appearances, representations,
or communications on behalf of their current employer.
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matters. 217 The ban does not apply to statements made as a witness
provided that the statements are based on the former employee's
special knowledge of a particular area and that no compensation
is received other than compensation fixed by law or regulation for
witnesses.
21 8
The penalties that accompany violations of any of the post-
employment restrictions are both criminal and administrative in
nature. The criminal penalties include a maximum fine of $10,000
and/or a maximum prison term of two years.2 19 The administrative
penalty authorizes the head of the employee's former agency to
prohibit the employee from making any appearance before or any
communication to the agency on behalf of another for up to five
years and to take other additional disciplinary action. ° The former
employee is entitled to notice, opportunity for a hearing, and
review by a federal district court of any disciplinary action taken.21
Today, the Ethics in Government Act is one of the primary
means by which the federal government regulates the post-employ-
ment activities of its former employees on behalf of private and
foreign interestsYm However, the statute does not address ade-
217 18 U.S.C. § 207(i).
2" Id. The President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform has proposed that
compensation be removed as an element for violation of the one year no contact rule of
stilsection c. The Commission instead proposes that representational activity on another
party's behalf should be prohibited without regard to whether compensation was received.
SERVE WrrH HONOR, supra note 202, at 77.
219 18 U.S.C. § 207(c).
- 18 U.S.C. § 2070).
221 Id.
m1 In addition to the post-employment restrictions of the Ethics in Government Act,
many of the federal regulatory agencies have their own sets of rules that similarly restrict
the activities of former employees. Agencies were given the responsibility to develop their
&Wn ethical guidelines under Executive Order 11222, issued by President Johnson on May
•8, 1965. This order was issued in the wake of the same hearings on ethics that led to the
1962 conflict of interest statutes. Hearings on H.R. 814 Before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 8, 33, 55, 92 (1962). These hearings stressed that many
conflict of interest problems could only be dealt with on the agency level.
These agency restrictions are typically enforceable not through criminal statutes but
rather through the vehicle of civil relief in the courts. R. VAUGHN, supra note 121, at 47
For an illustrative example of agency post-employment restrictions, see 16 C.F.R. § 1030.1201-
18, which discusses post-employment resttictions of the Consumer Products Safety Admin-
istration.
The drawback of the agency ethics programs is that they vary widely from agency to
agency. A recent example of an agency ethics program that failed to prevent abuse of power
by its current employees is the ethics program at the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. A growing scandal at HUD implicates past and present officers in a pattern
of getting HUD approval for financial assistance to politically well-connected real estate
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quately the difficulties that are created when former government
officials answer to foreign principals.
223
IV PROPOSED REFORMS OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION
ACT AND THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT
The Foreign Agents Registration Act and the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act are the two statutes that have the most direct impact on
the issue of former government officials working on behalf of
foreign interests. 224 The Foreign Agents Registration Act would
require those former officials working for foreign governments to
register their agency relationships and to disclose the nature of
their activity on behalf of those foreign interests. The restrictions
of FARA apply regardless of whether the former employee is
engaged in activity related to his or her former duties in government
service.
The Ethics in Government Act is triggered when former em-
ployees' activities on behalf of their benefactors (foreign or not)
are sufficiently related to their former duties as government offi-
cials. Depending on how closely related their agency duties are to
their former official duties, former employees face certain restric-
tions on what they can legally do on behalf of their foreign
principals. With respect to some activities that were part of their
developers. A three year old report on the HUD ethics program by the Office of Government
Ethics cites HUD's ethics program as "one of the most ill-managed this team has ever seen
in a major department." Chicago Trib., August 1, 1989, at Al, col. 1. If HUD could not
effectively monitor the activities of its current employees, one can only presume that the
activities of its former employees are similarly not scrutinized.
Even absent an applicable cnminal statute or agency rule, it has been proposed that
the federal government may also take action against a former employee through civil action
for breach of fiduciary duty. For an in-depth analysis of the advantages of such a proposal,
see Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Former Government Employees, 90 YALE L.J. 189 (1980).
Former attorneys for the government are also restricted in their post-employment
activities by the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility. Discipli-
nary Rule 9-101(B) provides that a "lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter
in which he has substantial responsibility as a public employee." This rule not only affects
former employees, it may also disqualify their future partners and associates from dealing
with the matter as well. The ABA rules are enforced through state bar associations. The
state bar associations may grant waivers of some of the post-employment ethical rules, but
the circumstances under which waivers may be granted differ from state to state. See R.
VAUGHN, supra note 121, at 87-90, for a fuller discussion of the application of the Code
of Professional Responsibility to issues of post-employment activity.
2' See infra notes 255-328 and accompanying text.
22 For a thorough discussion of the legislative history and the requirements of FARA,
see supra notes 33-118 and accompanying text. For a similar discussion of the Ethics in
Government Act, see supra notes 118-222 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 78
AMERICA FOR SALE
official responsibility, they may be barred for a certain period of
time. With respect to other activities in which their participation
was personal and substantial, former employees face a permanent
bar Depending upon how high a position they occupied, former
officials may also be barred from contacting their former agency
on their own behalf or on anyone else's for a full year
Ideally, these two statutes should be a sufficient check on the
activities of former government officials employed by foreign in-
terests. The relatively benign restrictions of FARA, which only
require registration and disclosure, should serve the function of
informing the agencies before whom these individuals appear of
the foreign agency relationship. The individual's statements can
then be assessed in light of that relationship. The more stringent
mandates of the Ethics in Government Act theoretically should
provide a deterrent to activity for a foreign benefactor that is so
closely related to the former official's duties as to raise legitimate
issues of conflict of interest.
In reality, both statutes are inadequate to effectively manage
the problems posed by former government officials in the employ
of foreigners. Thus, the following section will explore the relative
shortcomings of both Acts.
A. The Foreign Agents Registration Act: Problems and Proposals
for Change
1. Disclosure Does Not Greatly Affect the Former Official's
Power to Influence
With respect to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the thresh-
old issue is whether its internal logic applies to the problems
presented by ex-government officials. Congress' rationale in enact-
ing FARA was that if individuals were paid to speak on behalf of
foreign principals, they should have to disclose their agency rela-
tionship so that the recipients of their speeches can make informed
decisions regarding their credibility 225 The type of person contem-
'u The introduction of the Act reads:
It is hereby declared to be the policy and purpose of this Act to protect the
national defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United States
by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities
and other activities for or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign political
parties, and other foreign pnncipals so that the Government and the people
1989-90]
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plated by the original Act was the subversive propagandist, who
would be subjected to "the spotlight of pitiless publicity" regarding
his or her agency relationship. 226 Thus, the foreign agent would be
unable to make statements under a cloak of anonymity
When ex-government officials go to work for foreign govern-
ments, entirely opposite problems arise. Foreign propagandists,
before 1938, were able to gain an advantage due to the fact that
they were often strangers to their audience. Thus, they could appear
to be merely concerned ordinary citizens when making statements
on behalf of foreign benefactors. FARA took away this advantage
from foreign propagandists by making them known to their audi-
ence as foreign agents.
Former officials working for foreign interests gain advantage
not from anonymity but rather from familiarity The familiarity
that former officials have with ex-colleagues in the federal service
is their greatest asset. Former officials can navigate through bu-
reaucratic channels far easier than others who routinely deal with
federal agencies. Former officials have a great deal of confidential
information that is most valuable to their new employers. They
have substantial contacts within the agency, understand its proce-
dures, and know how to shape arguments for presentation based
on the informal practices and standards of the agency 227
Since former officials benefit from being known in agency
circles, the disclosure mandates of FARA do not take any advan-
tage away from them by making their agency affiliation a matter
of public record. Former officials still know a great deal of valuable
information that can be put to use through surrogates. Moreover,
the fact that they are working on behalf of foreign interests would
not necessarily result in their ex-colleagues appraising their state-
ments in the light of their new agency relationship. Many of their
ex-colleagues are looking forward to one day working in the private
sector themselves. The fact that their former co-workers are now
working in the private sector would not tend to change their
assessment of them or their statements. Michael Deaver was reg-
of the United States may be informed of the identity of such persons and may
appraise their statements and actions in the light of their associations and
activities.
22 U.S.C. § 611 (1942).
H.R. RP No. 1383, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., note 2 (1937); S. REP. No. 1783, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938)..
2 R. VAUGrtN, supra note 121, at 84.
= Id.
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istered as a foreign agent with FARA, yet this did not seem to
deter those whom he contacted during his lobbying career.
Moreover, this disclosure requirement does not change the im-
age of former officials for many of their ex-colleagues because
they are likely already aware of those activities. Those ex-colleagues
may not know the exact nature of the lobbying activity, but they
are informed nonetheless that this or that large lobbying firm does
a good deal of business with foreign clients. The fact that their
former co-workers are registered under FARA adds nothing to
what they already know about them.
It is this commentator's contention that the disclosure mandates
of FARA do not take away any advantage from ex-government
officials and, thus, FARA does not prevent these ex-officials from
exercising undue influence with their former agency colleagues.
The logic behind FARA was to limt the influence of foreign agents
by making their activities public, but publicity does not neutralize
effectively the potential of former officials to influence their former
colleagues.
2. Noncompliance with the Act is a Continuing Problem
Yet even if registration under FARA could undercut the influ-
ence of former officials working for foreign principals, there is
still the practical difficulty of widespread noncompliance with
FARA's registration requirements. In 1989, the Justice Department
had registered 832 agents working for 2,039 foreign principals. 229
With nearly every foreign government and countless foreign private
interests all lobbying the U.S. government, it does not take a vivid
imagination to surmise that many foreign agents are not registering
their activities as required under FARA.
One reason for the low rate of compliance is that the Foreign
Agents Registration Office is not adequately staffed to monitor
compliance and seek corrective action against those who either fall
to register or fall to give accurate disclosure on their registration
statement. Historically, the FARA office has had between six and
seventeen persons working for it, including attorneys, paralegals,
"I U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
oF 1938, as amended, for calendar year 1988. Telephone interview with Mr. Roger Fontanella
of the Foreign Agents Registration Umt of the Justice Department (January 23, 1990). This
report is authorized by the Foreign Agents Registration Act itself. Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act, 56 Stat. 258, 22 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
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and clerical personnel. 20 Seventeen people does not seem to be
enough to accomplish the mission of FARA. 231 Over twenty-five
years ago, a Congressional committee criticized the staffing of the
FARA office as inadequate to handle the thorough processing of
all registration statements. FBI checks of the registration statements
turned up a number of discrepancies, omissions, and inconsistencies
that the FARA staff had overlooked. 22 Today, there are roughly
the same number of attorneys in the FARA office. This under-
staffing begs the question of how seriously the federal government
has considered the potential problems of foreign agents operating
anonymously in this country.
Noncompliance with the mandates of FARA has been uncov-
ered repeatedly whenever Congress investigates legislative lobbying
efforts. 2 3 In 1962, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
looked into lobbying efforts by nations seeking higher import
quotas under the Sugar Act, scores of agents suddenly appeared
for registration with FARA.
234
The actual rates of noncompliance are dramatized in two recent
studies of FARA disclosure statements by the Congressional Re-
search Service235 and the General Accounting Office. 2 6 According
to the GAO survey of forty-five random registration files, (1) sixty-
seven percent (261/392) of the required statements and exhibits
were not received within the prescribed time limits; (2) thirty-three
percent (157/476) of the dissemination of information reports were
not received on time; and (3) seventy percent (154/22) of the
supplemental statements were not received on time. 2 7 Although the
2" Telephone interview with Brian Ahern, Attorney for the Foreign Agents Registration
Office (July 25, 1984).
231 Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United
States: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 54
(1963).
232 Id. at 13.
23 Note, supra note 114, at 703. See also Berman & Heiman, Lobbying by Foreign
Governments on the Sugar Act Amendments of 1962, 28 LAw & CONTEMP, PROBS. 416
(1963); Note, supra note 39, at 422.
14 Note, supra note 114, at 703.
"I Congressional Research Service, The Foreign Agents Registration Act, prepared for
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter CRS].
236 United States General Accounting Office, Improvements Needed in the Administra-
tion of Foreign Agents Registration (1974 and 1980) [hereinafter GAO].
.. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF TE UNITED STATES, EFEcTrENEsS OF TE FOREIGN
AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED, AND ITS ADMINISTRATION BY THE DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTiCE, 86, 87 (1974).
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1980 follow up study by the GAO found an improved compliance
rate of fifty-one percent, that is still an inadequate level.
2
18
A further factor in the continued noncompliance with FARA
is the awkward process that the FARA office must resort to in
order to compel full disclosure from registrants. Currently, if an
individual refuses to comply with the Act, the FARA office must
ask the Attorney General to obtain an injunction against the in-
dividual in federal district court.239 Despite the efforts of the district
courts to expedite matters, the appeals process could result in
protracted litigation before an individual is ultimately compelled
to fully disclose all pertinent registration information. Litigation
between the Attorney General and the Irish Northern Aid Com-
mittee lasted eleven years from the time that enforcement action
was threatened by the Justice Department until the Second Circuit
finally ruled that the committee had to register as a foreign agent.M
Clearly, FARA has not fully realized the expectations of Con-
gress regarding compliance.241 A number of proposals have been
advanced to improve compliance with FARA. One obvious neces-
sary change would be to stiffen the penalties for noncompliance.
24
2
With a maximum fine of $10,000 for violations of the Act, FARA
does not seem to sufficiently deter individuals who regularly receive
several times that amount for routine lobbying services. If the
"1 1980 GAO Report, supra note 236, at 133, Enclosure I at 3.
239 The Act provides:
Whenever in the judgment of the Attorney General any person is engaged in
or about to engage in any acts which constitute or will constitute a violation
of any provision of the Act, or regulations issued thereunder, the Attorney
General may make application to the appropriate United States district court
for an order enjoimng such person from continuing to act as an agent of such
foreign principal, or for an order requiring compliance with any.appropriate
provision of the Act or regulation thereunder. The district court shall have
junsdiction and authority to issue a temporary or permanent injunction,
restraimng order or such other order which it may deem proper.
22 U.S.C. § 618(0 (1982).
240 Attorney General v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 668 F.2d 159, 160 (1982).
24' CRS, supra note 235, at 1. The Introductory Statement to this Committee clearly
expresses Congressional disappointment with the effectiveness of FARA.
242 In increasing the penalties for noncompliance, the deterrent effect can only be taken
seriously by potential offenders if the Attorney General's Office ends its practice of readily
agreeing to consent decrees to enjoin violators from further noncompliance instead of
pumshing past noncompliance. Offenders are quite often sophisticated lobbyists who are
well aware of the restrictions of FARA. Their noncompliance constitutes a continuing
violation of the Act (22 U.S.C. § 618(e)) and should not be excused. See Attorney Gen. v.
United States-Japan Trade Council, Inc., No. 76-1290 (D.D.C. 1976); Attorney Gen. v.
DGA Int'l, Nos. 75-2040, 75-2041, and 75-2042 (D.D.C. 1975); Attorney General v. Arab
Info. Cent., No. 76-279 (D.D.C. 1976).
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maximum fine were to be raised to a sigmficant level or left to a
court's discretion, there would be a genuine deterrent effect upon
high-powered Washington lobbyists.
Increased penalties alone will not bring about the desired level
of compliance. It will also be necessary to increase the enforcement
powers of the FARA office.23 Currently, the FARA office must
often resort to a grand jury investigation to achieve compliance.2
Granting the FARA office the power to summon individuals to
appear before it, testify and/or produce records, and to assess civil
penalties for minor violations of the Act would do much to expedite
the process. 245
FARA's staff would have to increase substantially if these
broader powers were granted. In the current climate of budget
deficits and federal spending curbs, this may seem an impractical
suggestion. However, the increased cost of additional staff could
be more than offset by the increased amount of fines that a larger
staff could collect from violators of the Act.
Another proposal for change in the Act is to change its name
in order to remove the subversive and criminal connotations of
registration as a "foreign agent.' '246 Advocates of this proposal
stress the need for a new name for the Act to complement its
modern focus on lobbyists as opposed to subversive propagandists.
Removing the stigma attached to the Act, it is argued, would lead
to higher rates of compliance. People would not be as hesitant to
register as an "international information aide" as opposed to a
"foreign agent." 7
This commentator has some reservations about the proposal.
While a name change may cause some individuals to register their
affiliation, the main objection to the Act is its extensive and
complex registration requirements and not the Act itself. Those
who do not wish to register their activities will continue not to do
so regardless of how the Act happens to be named.
14 This was one of the proposals mentioned in the CRS study. CRS, supra note 235,
at 15.
2" Id.
241 Id. at 16. The power to assess civil penalties for mnnor violations is important
because the FARA office would hesitate to pursue criminal sanctions for minor violatipns
of the Act. The power to assess smaller civil penalties of $500 would be a more appropriate
means of correcting minor deficiencies in registration. An amendment to FARA granting
the FARA office the power to assess civil penalties was proposed by Senator George
McGovern in 1977, but was not enacted. S. 2045, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
2" CRS, supra note 235, at 2.
247 Id.
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3. FARA 's Language is Often Unclear
Aside from the issues of FARA's dubious effectiveness on
former government officials and its chronic pattern of noncompli-
ance, FARA has also been criticized as a byzantine scheme of
broad restrictions and numerous exemptions in which it is difficult
to know whether one is obliged to register. Several possible solu-
tions have been advanced to deal with this issue: (1) to constrict
the broad sweeping language of the act; (2) to make potential
registrants apply for an exemption;248 (3) to allow potential regis-
trants to send a letter stating that they intend to rely on one of
FARA's exemptions; 249 and (4) to clarify existing exemptions.
20
Constncting the scope of the Act does not seem to be a viable
solution. Foreign interests lobby the U.S. government on countless
issues: trade restrictions, fishing rights, foreign aid, communication
regulations, international finance, environmental concerns, imrm-
gration policy, technology transfers, and the list goes on. Lobbying
also takes many forms; appearances before Congress, applying for
agency rulings, personal and informal interaction with government
officials, letter writing campaigns, etc. It would not seem practi-
cable to narrow the scope of the Act to cover only certain issues
and activities given the wide range of lobbying by foreign interests
that should be subject to the Act.
Making all potential registrants apply for an exemption before
they engage in their proposed activity has some appeal. Under the
current scheme, individuals unilaterally claim exemptions and rely
on them and the legitimacy of the exemption is rarely scrutinized.
25
1
Potential pitfalls for this proposal include increased paper work
and staffing demands 252 as well as confusion over who would be
considered a "potential registrant." Theoretically, every U.S. busi-
ness that contemplated any foreign dealings would have to apply
and wait for a commercial exemption under FARAY.2 3 Such a result
would seem to be an undue burden upon international commerce
by putting U.S. businesses at a distinct competitive disadvantage.
Such an outcome would be inconsistent with the original intent of
FARA.
14 Id. at 18.
249 GAO, supra note 236, Enclosure I, at 10.
m CRS, supra note 235, at 2.
21, Id. at 17.
22 Id. at 18. The CRS report recogmzed this problem but argued that the benefits
would outweigh the costs.
-3 22 U.S.C. § 613(d) (1982).
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The third proposal, viz., letting potential registrants send writ-
ten notification of their intention to rely on one of FARA's ex-
emptions, may solve part of the problem with respect to
international business. This proposal would let individuals and
businesses, so long as they are claiming their exemption in good
faith, to proceed with international transactions without a go-ahead
from FARA. If evaluation of the exemption by the FARA office
reveals an invalid exemption, which would be rare for a purely
commercial transaction, the FARA office would then inform the
individual accordingly This seems a fair compromise between the
concerns of limiting restrictions on commerce and promoting better
compliance with FARA.
The final proposal (clarifying the existing exemptions) seems
most directly geared toward the problem. The confusion over ex-
emptions plays a substantial role in persistent noncompliance with
the Act because individuals are unable to tell if they can qualify
for an exemption. Clarifying the exemptions would eliminate the
need for either obtaining advance clearance or sending a letter of
reliance on an exemption since individuals would usually be able
to readily tell if their activity is within the scope of the exemption.
The problem with clarifying the exemptions is the same as the
problem of restricting the scope of the Act. There is a wide variety
of international contact that logically should be exempt from the
mandates of FARA. It might be extremely difficult to draft ex-
emptions to cover all of this activity without further complicating
the exemption issues .254
FARA is undoubtedly in need of reform to increase compliance
with and understanding of its mandates. However, with respect to
issues of ex-government officials working for foreign concerns, the
problem remains that public disclosure of their activity does not
have the desired inhibiting effect on their ability to influence their
former colleagues. It is only when the disclosure mandates of
FARA are combined with the post-employment restrictions of the
Ethics in Government Act that the influence of former officials
can be limited.
B. The Ethics in Government Act: Problems and Proposals for
Change
The Ethics in Government Act goes beyond the relatively be-
nign registration requirements of FARA. Title V of the Act makes
Congress has a history of muddying the waters of an area of the law in the name
of "simplicity" (e.g., the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
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it a criminal offense for ex-government officials to engage in certain
activities closely related to their former official duties. 2 5 The re-
stnctions placed upon individuals will vary according to the degree
of relation between their former duties and the current activity and
also upon their level of government service. 2 6 The Act applies to
former officials working for both foreign and domestic interests.
2 .1
As argued above, the Foreign Agents Registration Act does not
by itself effectively neutralize the capacity of ex-government offi-
cials to influence their former agencies. The Ethics in Government
Act, ideally, should achieve this goal by barring certain activities
where former officials have their greatest capacity to use undue
influence. This capacity is greatest with the individual's former
agency and especially on matters that were part of his or her
"official responsibility" 258 or in which he or she participated "per-
sonally and substantially.1
259
The Ethics in Government Act, however, is as problematic a
statute as FARA. The succeeding section outlines some of the
major problems with the Act as well as some proposed solutions.
1. United States v Nofztiger and the Future of Title V
A major hurdle for the Act is a recent ruling by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 260 The case involved
the conviction under the Ethics m Government Act of Lyn Nofzger,
formerly President Reagan's Assistant for Political Affairs. Nofziger
was originally convicted of violating subsection c of Title 18,
section 207 because he commumcated with his former agency with
intent to influence its action.
261
2 See supra notes 201-22 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 119-222 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(b) (1982).
258 18 U.S.C. § 207(b).
29 18 U.S.C. § 207(a).
m' United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
26' The statute provides:
Whoever, other than a special Government employee having been so
employed as specified in subsection (d) of this section, within one year after
such employment has ceased, knowingly acts as agent or attorney for, or
otherwise represents, anyone other than the United States in any formal or
informal appearance before, or with the intent to influence, makes any oral
or written commumcation on behalf of anyone other than the United States
to-
(1) the department or agency in which he served as an officer or employee,
or any officer or employee thereof, and
(2) in connection with any judicial, rulemaking, or other proceeding,
1989-901
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Nofziger was found to have committed three violations of the
Act by contacting former colleagues still at the White House during
the one year ban period on contact with the former agency by a
high official 6 2 Nofziger was found to have lobbied on behalf of
the Welbilt Electronic Die Corporation, a defense contractor; the
National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, a labor union
representing licensed maritime officers; and the Fairchild Republic
Corporation, a division of Fairchild Industries, another defense
contractor.
263
Nofziger appealed his conviction largely on the ground that for
a conviction the statute requires that he be shown to have had
knowledge of all the facts that made his conduct illegal.264 Focusing
on the word "knowingly" in subsection c, Nofzlger argued that
he had to know that the Wute House had a "direct and substantial
interest" in the matters on which he lobbied, as well as all of the
other circumstances that made his conduct illegal under subsection
c.
2 6 5
The government countered that the word "knowingly" only
applies to one who "acts as agent or attorney for, or otherwise
represents" a party and not to one who "with the intent to influ-
ence, makes any written or oral commumcation."126 In short, the
government argued that, under subsection c, a conviction for acting
as attorney or agent requires knowledge of all the facts that make
the conduct illegal, but conviction for making oral or written
communication to the agency does not require knowledge of all
application, request for a ruling, or other determination, contract, claim,
controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular mat-
ter, and
(3) which is pending before such department or agency or in which such
department or agency has a direct and substantial interest-
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (emphasis added).
2 The group of high officials subject to the one year no contact ban is explained in
subsection d of § 207. 18 U.S.C. § 207(d).
26 Nofziger was found guilty of contacting then Attorney General Edwin Meese, James
E. Jenkins, then deputy-counselor to the President, and with members of the National
Security staff. The Wedtech scandal eventually expanded to include allegations of undue
influence against Meese. Mr. Meese eventually resigned from office in the face of serious
charges regarding his conduct, some of which originated from within his own Justice
Department. Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 444.
Id. at 445.
1 Id. at 446.
Id. at 447.
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the operative facts. The issue boiled down to what level of mens
rea was required under subsection c; whether a conviction for
making written or oral communication was a strict liability offense
or whether it required knowledge of all pertinent facts that made
the communication illegal.
267
The court, after an exhaustive analysis of both the wording of
the Act and the legislative history, concluded that the statute was
ambiguous on the issue of the requisite mens rea for subsection
c.268 In light of this ambiguity, the court reasoned that it could not
impose strict liability for the communication offense under subsec-
tion c, i.e., the government had to have shown that Nofziger had
operative knowledge of all the facts that made his communication
illegal.269 The court held that the government had not met that
burden in its indictment. 270 Accordingly, the court then reversed
and remanded Noffiger's conviction. 271
The court's decision bodes ill for further use of the current
statutes to deal with the "revolving door" problem. Due to the
similar wording used in subsections a and b of section 207, this
decision could mean that the whole range of communication of-
fenses under Title V of the Ethics in Government Act could not
be prosecuted effectively The court's decision, by analogy, could
require a showing by the government that the offender had full
knowledge of all the facts that made his or her communication
illegal. Considering the behind-the-scenes nature of much of the
communication between former officials and their former agencies,
it may be an impossible burden of proof for the government to
meet in most cases.
The Nofztger decision thus puts the continuing viability of Title
V into question as a means to curb the abuses of former officials
selling their influence to interests both foreign and domestic. How
many of the former official's colleagues would be willing to talk
to investigators and thus jeopardize their future job prospects in
private industry? Moreover, how many of them would withhold
information to avoid an investigation into their own conduct?
m7 Id. at 450.
" The court remarked that "we are dealing with a statute that is hardly a model of
clarity." Id. at 452. Circuit Judge Edwards vehemently dissented, stating that the majority
was fabncating ambiguity where none existed. Id. at 455.
Id. at 454.
270 Id.
2 Id.
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2. Inefficiency in Enforcement
The Ethics in Government Act provides that an independent
counsel is to be appointed by the Attorney General to investigate
any "specific information" that high government officials have
engaged in conduct violating any federal criminal law not amount-
ing to a petty offense
27 2
The Attorney General must ask the division of the federal court
that is set up to appoint independent counsels273 to do so in two
instances. First, if after a preliminary investigation the Attorney
General finds "reasonable grounds to believe that further investi-
gation or prosecution is warranted," the Attorney General must
seek the appointment of an independent counsel. 274 Alternatively,
if after ninety days from the beginning of the preliminary investi-
gation (and after the lapse of any extension of time to that pe-
riod)2 75 the Attorney General has not notified the division of the
court that there are no reasonable grounds for further investigation,
the Attorney General must ask for an independent counsel to be
appointed. 276
It is crucial to note that the Attorney General's determination
of whether further investigation by an independent counsel is war-
ranted is not reviewable by any court.277 What this effectively does
is to make the Attorney General "the gate that either opens or
closes" the independent counsel mechanism.
278
This commentator asserts that the current version of the inde-
pendent counsel provisions of the Act place far too much discretion
2- 28 U.S.C. § 591-598 (1988). In making the determination of whether to authorize
an investigation, the Attorney General "shall consider only (A) the specificity of the
information received; and 03) the credibility of the source of the information." 28 U.S.C.
§ 591(d)(1)(A), (B).
Currently, the independent counsel provisions of Title 28 only apply to high level
executive branch officers and some high level political party national campaign committee
officers. The President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform has recommended that
the provisions be extended to high level officials of the legislative branch as well. SERVE
WITH HONOR, supra note 202, at 111.
27' 28 U.S.C. § 49 created the division of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia to appoint special prosecutors upon the request of the Attorney General. 28
U.S.C. § 49 (1982).
'' 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1982).
", The Attorney General may apply for an extension of time in addition to the 90 day
period from the beginning of the preliminary investigation. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(3) (1988).
26 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(B) (1982).
-1 28 U.S.C. § 592(0.
278 Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982: Hearings on S. 2059 Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Rudman).
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in the hands of the Attorney General. With respect to potential
investigations of criminal post-employment activity by former high
officials, the danger exists that the Attorney General may be po-
litically motivated to reach a finding that no reasonable ground
exists for further investigation. An independent counsel investiga-
tion may unearth damaging information that could harm the cur-
rent administration and perhaps even the Attorney General. Former
Attorney General Meese requested an independent counsel to in-
vestigate Lyn Nofziger only to later be implicated personally in the
Wedtech scandal in the wake of the evidence uncovered by the
investigation.
279
As the independent counsel law stands now, one individual is
entrusted with the final irreversible decision of whether an inves-
tigation of alleged criminal impropriety by a current or former
high government official will take place. This commentator main-
tains that the potential for abuse of discretion by the Attorney
General is a cause for concern. °0
3. Proposals for Change
Answers to the infirmities of the Ethics in Government Act are
not easy given the behind the scenes nature of the activity What
goes on behind closed doors in Washington is difficult to monitor
and regulate in comparison to open and public activities carried
on by federal agencies. However, reasonable and rational reforms
are needed if the Act is to do more than give statutory lip service
to the goal of governmental integrity
The answers proposed by this commentator are not blanket
prohibitions against former high government officials working for
foreign interests. Proposals such as the Post Employment Integrity
Act of 1986, 28' which, if enacted, would have barred former Cab-
inet and White House officials from ever lobbying for foreign
governments or corporations, go too far in dealing with the issue.28 2
Such a restrictive approach would severely hamper the govern-
'" Chicago Trib., May 12, 1987, § 1, at 1.
2 See Note, The Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Problems with the Attorney
General's Discretion and Proposals for Reform, 1985 Duirr L.J. 497 (1985).
S, 5. 2334, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1986).
Church, Acid Raining on Deaver's Parade, 127 Tmm, May 5, 1986, at 20. The Act
was proposed by Sen. Strom Thurmond and heanngs were held but no further action was
taken on the measure. Most observers agreed that the legislation was aimed directly at
Michael Deaver since it was introduced dunng the height of public attention on the Deaver
affair. The bill would have applied retroactively to Deaver.
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ment's ability to recruit qualified people for top policy positions,
especially for foreign policy matters. Effective reforms should work
within the existing restrictions set up by Title V
a. Clarifying the Requisite Mens Rea for Offenses
The answer, in this commentator's opimon, lies with clarifica-
tion and better enforcement of existing law The first clarification
that needs to be made is the issue of what mental state is required
for conviction under the post-employment restrictions. The Nofziger
court found the statute to be ambiguous on whether it imposed
strict liability, culpability based on knowledge of the operative
facts making the contact illegal, or some other altogether different
standard. A clarification is required unless the Supreme Court
overrules the decision.
The most natural reading of the statute, to this commentator's
mind, is that voiced by the dissent of Judge Edwards in the
Nofziger decision. 283 Judge Edwards argued that the plain reading
of the statute provides for two mens rea standards for the two
offenses of subsection c of section 207 84 For the offense of acting
as agent or attorney, the mens rea requirement is that former
officials must act knowingly-they must have operative knowledge
of all the facts that make acting as agent or attorney illegal.
2
1
5
For the communication offense, the requisite mens rea is simply
as it is stated in the statute, to wit, that the actor made oral or
written commumcation with the intent to influence.2 6 It seems
absurd to think that anything else would be required for intent
here. What other reason could former officials have to write or
contact their former agencies, with the intent to influence action,
unless the agency has a substantial and direct interest in the matter?
Contact with the former agency would not have any purpose to
an ex-official turned lobbyist unless that agency had a substantial
and direct interest in the matter.
Congress should amend the Act to make it clear that the mens
rea requirement for the appearance offenses in section 207 is to
"knowingly act as agent or attorney or otherwise represent"
while the mens rea requirement for the communication offenses is
Nofztiger, 878 F.2d at 454 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
I d. at 455.
28 Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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to "make written or oral commumcation with the intent to
influence. 287
b. Removing the Potential for Abuse of Discretion by the Attorney
General
Regarding the problem of the potential for abuse of discretion
by the Attorney General, there is little that can be done to force
the Attorney General's hand.28 Currently, there are only three
ways to challenge the Attorney General's refusal to ask for an
independent counsel. First, the Judiciary committee of either House
or a majority of the members of either party on those committees
may request that the Attorney General apply for independent coun-
sel appointment. 289 The Attorney General must reply to the request
in writing, stating the reasons for his or her decision. 290 Second,
the committee making the request may make public the information
received regarding the matter.291 This could be done in order to
put public pressure on the Attorney General to apply for a special
prosecutor.292 Finally, the Congress could use its ultimate power of
impeachment of the Attorney General. 293
None of these current options is a satisfactory remedy for abuse
of discretion by the Attorney General. Congress may request an
independent counsel and demand a reason why the Attorney Gen-
eral will not comply, but Congress is powerless to enforce its
request.294 Publication of information by the committee would only
be effective if public outcry were sufficient to spur the Attorney
General to act. 295 Moreover, the propriety of making such infor-
- 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1982).
2u Note, supra note 280, at 507-11. This Note details three instances where abuse of
discretion by the Attorney General has been alleged in declimng to ask for a special
prosecutor to investigate violations of the Ethics in Government Act. The author further
explains several proposed solutions to the potential problem of abuse of discretion by the
Attorney General.
-9 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(1) (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(2)(3).
9' 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(4).
292 Note, supra note 280, at 509.
29' U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
294 Note, supra note 280, at 508. See H.R. REP No. 1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23
(1978) (dissenting views of Reps. Wiggins, McClory, Butler, Moorehead, and Kindness)
("Although the House or Senate Judiciary Committees, in whole or in part, may request
the Attorney General to appoint a special prosecutor, H.R. 9705 [Special Prosecutor Act
of 1978] creates no more power to enforce that request than now exists.").
'9 Note, supra note 280, at 509. See 124 CONG. RPc. 31,976 (1978) (statement of Rep.
Hyde) ("[P]ublic opimon is not always easy to mobilize and it is foolish to wait until a
grave cnsis has developed before establistung workable procedures to meet that crisis.").
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mation public is questionable given its unsubstantiated character 296
Impeachment is "far too unwieldy and time consuming to act as
an effective mechamsm to control abuses of discretion.
297
One proposed solution to the potential problems of abuse of
discretion would be to confer standing upon private citizens to
challenge the Attorney General's refusal to apply for the appoint-
ment of an independent counsel. 298 Such a provision was considered
in the first drafts of two predecessor bills to the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act, but was not included in the final Act. 299 This type of
provision would allow a court to assess the conduct of the Attorney
General in reaching his or her decision.
This proposal, however, is fraught with problems. First, unless
one court were designated as the forum for challenging these
decisions, confusion would arise over what the proper standard for
review of Attorney General decisions should be.3°° This proposal
would also make the reviewability of ethics decisions depend upon
the legal resources of plaintiffs; if they are without funds for
litigating the issue, the Attorney General's decision would not be
reviewed.30' Lastly, there is also the danger that this proposal would
allow even baseless allegations of criminal conduct against a current
or former official to be part of the public record in open court. 02
A second proposal would be to give Congress the power through
the Judiciary committees to enforce its request for appointment of
an independent counsel by seeking writs of mandamus to force the
Attorney General to apply for the appointment.3 3 One purported
29 Note, supra note 280, at 509. See S. RaP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADMnN. NEWS 4216 ("Just because a person holds a
high-level position does not justify making unsubstantiated allegations of criminal conduct
public, nor does it justify publicly announcing the initiation of a criminal investigation at
the very early stage of the investigation.").
297 Note, supra note 280, at 590. See Removing Politics from the Administration of
Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974) (prepared statement
of Sen. Cranston) ("[I]mpeachment by Congress of lugh Federal office holders in modem
times ordinarily is too cumbersome and consumes too much of Congress' time").
291 Note, supra note 280, at 511.
2" Id. at 506, 512. See H.R. 11476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 495, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976).
11 Note, supra note 280, at 512.
301 Id.
3 Id.
3 Id. at 513. "Such a provision was included in some of the predecessor bills to what
eventually became the Ethics Act." Id. See H.R. 2711, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R.
8125, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); H.R. 8538, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); H.R. 10669,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 10868, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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advantage of this approach over conferring standing upon private
citizens is that it would not necessarily result in disclosure of
baseless allegations of criminal conduct in open court.
4
The disadvantages of the writ of mandamus scheme include the
potential that it could be used by the members of one party to
challenge the integrity of the Attorney General of the other party
and thus cause the other party political embarrassment. 05 It is also
questionable whether the Judiciary committees would be able to
take the time to sort through all the available facts in order to
make a reasoned decision on whether to seek a writ.3°6
A third proposal to correct abuses of discretion by the Attorney
General would be to allow the division of the court responsible for
appointing independent counsel to review the decisions of the At-
torney General. 07 Any abuse of discretion could be remedied by
review of the Court. The advantages of this proposal as compared
to the writ of mandamus proposal are its low risk of leaks of
unsubstantiated allegations and a decreased risk of partisan abuse
of the process. 30 1 On the down-side, allowing judicial review by the
division of the court "would greatly increase the workload of the
panel. ' ' 319 Also problematic are issues of what information would
constitute the record for review and what the correct legal standard
of review would be.
310
A final proposal would be to create an independent federal
agency to adminster the Ethics in Government Act.3 11 The idea of
an independent agency originated some thirty years ago with Pro-
fessor Abraham Chayes, then an advisor to President Kennedy 312
The original proposal was for an appointed commission to review
the financial affairs of high level appointees and nominees to screen
3' Note, supra note 280, at 514. See Provision for a Special Prosecutor: Hearings on
H.R. 14476, H.R. 11357, H.R. 11999, H.R. 8281, H.R. 8039, H.R. 15634, and Title I of
S. 495 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. note 91, at 160 (1976) (statement of Archibald Cox, former Special
Prosecutor).
305 Note, supra note 280, at 514. Using ethics charges to bash the other party is not
unheard of in Congress. The Jim Wright scandal was spurred, in part, by the desire of
Republicans to loosen the Democrat's stranglehold over the House of Representatives.
306 Id.
Id. at 515.
38 Id.
"I Id. at 515.
110 Id. at 516-17.
3 Id. at 517.
M' R. RoBERTs, supra note 123, at 198.
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for conflict of interest problems.3 1 3 That idea has been broadened
by later advocates into a proposal for a commission with sole
authority over conflict of interest screemng as well as investigations
of ethics charges against high level officials.3 14 This commission
would be given the authority that the Attorney General now has
to conduct a preliminary investigation and then to ask for a special
prosecutor 315 The commission might also be empowered to assess
penalties against violators of the Act in the form of fines or
restitution.3
16
One advantage of such a scheme would be to remove the
decisions over special prosecutors from potential partisan influence
at the Justice Department. Commissioners could be evenly distrib-
uted between the two parties to avoid use of the cominussion as a
political weapon. This proposal would also reduce the danger of
public disclosures of mere allegations because the cominussion could
conduct in camera proceedings. 317
There are also a number of pitfalls to consider with respect to
the independent agency proposal. The commission may not receive
enough complaints to keep it busy 318 The result rmght be Con-
gressional impetus to scrap the committee as a waste of money 319
The committee in turn might be tempted to ask for a special
prosecutor more often in order to justify its existence. 320 However,
if a new independent agency were created to deal with allegations
of ethics violations, more individuals may come forward who were
reluctant to approach the Justice Department with their informa-
tion.
321
There is also the danger that, even without partisan wrangling,
the commission could take on the character of a McCarthy style
witch-hunt. The spectre of an all powerful ethics police with an
army of lawyers and accountants at its disposal raises concerns of
fairness to the accused. 322 As several observers during the recent
313 Id.
314 ITd.
311 Id. at 198, 199.
3,6 Id. at 199.
317 Note, supra note 280, at 518.
311 Id. at 519.
319 Id.
30 Id. at 520.
321 Id.
3= Similar reservations were expressed in Congress, during the hearings on the Ethics
in Government Act, over proposals to have the Office of Ethics appoint and direct the
ethics officers in the various federal agencies. Rep. Danielson, then chairman of the House
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ethics hearings on former House Speaker Jim Wright noted, a team
of expert legal and financial investigators could find skeletons in
just about anyone's closet.
c. The Need for a Greater Variety of Enforcement Tools
Currently, the only sanctions that may be applied against viol-
ators of the post-employment restrictions of the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act are the two years imprisonment and the $10,000 fine.
Many advocates of alternative forms of sanction argue that pro-
secutors may decline to prosecute some lesser violations of these
provisions given the choice between no prosecution and a harsh
criminal pumshment for a minor infraction. 323
The President's Commission on Federal Ethics Reform has
proposed a number of alternative sanction schemes. 32 First, they
propose that the Attorney General be allowed to pursue new civil
and misdemeanor penalties for mere knowing yiolations of the Act,
while retaimng the criminal penalties for willful violations of the
Act. 32 The Commission further advocated that the Attorney Gen-
eral be empowered to seek injunctive relief for violations of the
Act. 326 This power could be used to halt impending or ongoing
violations of the Act's provisions. 327 These proposals would provide
the Attorney General with the power to seek swifter and surer
sanctions against violators of the Act since the standard of proof
required would be a "preponderance of the evidence" as opposed
to the more onerous criminal standard of "reasonable doubt." 32
The Ethics in Government Act is in need of substantive amend-
ment to make it the effective tool that is needed to check the
influence of former government officials working for both foreign
and domestic interests. With the renewed emphasis that the Bush
Judiciary Committee, remarked that the proposal would create "an absolute bureaucratic
monster, a band of roving commissars, who will be sprinkled throughout the various
government agencies willy-nilly on a rotating basis to look under every leaf and twig." 124
CONG. Rac. 31996 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978). His colleague, Rep. Ryan, opposed the proposal
to create the office of ethics because it would "create a priesthood of ethics counselors
[and] mullahs of the U.S. Government" who would dictate to the agencies "what ought to
be." Id. at 31997-98. See R. ROBERTS, supra note 123, at 161.
33 SERvE WiTH HONOR, supra note 202, at 104-05.
12 Id. at 104.
325 Id.
11 Id. at 107.
3 Id.
12 Id. at 105.
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administration is placing on governmental ethics, the outlook is
hopeful for meaningful change.
CONCLUSION
In our pluralistic society, individuals and groups exercise their
democratic rights by lobbying the government on issues of concern
to them. However, when influential former government officials
sell their lobbying skills to foreign interests, the integrity of the
federal service and the legitimacy of the government's policy de-
cisions are threatened. The actions of these individuals demean the
federal service in the public ind as simply another tool for private
gain. Worse yet, their actions threaten the policy outcomes of the
government by crowding out the legitimate interests of U.S. citizens
in favor of extrinsic foreign interests.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act and the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act are the two main statutory curbs on the activities of
former officials working as agents for foreign principals. Ideally,
they should work in tandem to prevent these individuals from
exercising undue influence over the federal government. In reality,
the problem is all too apparent from the headlines of influence
peddling for both foreign and domestic concerns by current and
former bureaucrats. Both Acts are in need of substantive change
in order to adequately address the problems that these former
officials present.
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